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INTE)D!J::TION 
political trust is basic to the st'l.bility and sunrival 
of our: democracy. iI.ithout the trust of citizens I political 
leaders are without power. r 0 operate, taey must have the 
"loyal co.operati~ of members of the system "itilout having to 
to specify in advance what such coopera,tion will entail" 
(Gamson, 1968: 43). The effectiveness of political leadership 
depends to some extent on this "blank chect." Without it, 
'l.uthorities lose the capacity to "commit r:esources to attain 
collective goals" (Gamson~1968:43l· Trust t.herefqre 
functions as a form of popular support for the politica:l 
system. rais trust assists members of society in tolerating 
policy outcomes to which tiley are opposed (Gamson,168:45; 
Easton,1965: 278} by suhmer:ging individual desires to the 
needs of the entire nation. Success in leader:ship r:equir:es 
tr:ust; this is becoming even mor:e important today,. given the 
complexity of the problems le3.ders must deal wittl, and ina 
society wher:e r:acial and ettlnic minor:ities ar:e demanding 
political equality {Aheri:lach and walker,1970:1199}. 
The very definition of democracy r:equir:es that the 
ge.neral public par:ticipa te in political aecis ion making ~ 
Consensus theory states that ttle tJiieal Dem3cratic 
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citizen ••• covets his right to pl~ce demands mpOD elites" 
thomgh he often chooses not to exercise it, aod when he does, 
does so ooly in "the prescribed m~oner and ~ppropriate 
circumstances" (Wright,1976:51) • The option of exercising 
influence checks elite power and perpetuates til.e Democr~tic 
(liright, 1976: 51). The coo vic tion tha t one is 
powerless to influence the govecnment may lead to feelings 
that officials are breaching the political norms, that an 
element of i11egitamcy has enteced into the political system 
(Easton,1965:299}. A sense of efficacy also proll!;)tes 
solidarity in society. Citizens perceive that the common 
will is obeyed by the politic~l system. The jovernment 
serves the' purposes of the illany, protecting 
rights so that they lllay proceed with 
happiness." If the political order betrays 
their political 
the "pursuit of 
the pubTic and 
the puD.lic percei.ves that they are powerless, the common bond 
between people begins to disintegrate and the threat of lllass 
society becomes real. and if tile atomization of society :loes 
occur, its susceptibility to the j,nfluence oE cilarismat,ic 
indi vid uals or groups or to "in:ationa1 polit ical outbursts" 
(Wright, 1976: 23) is considenbly heigiltened. 
The peesent study seeks to discover the relationships 
that exist among three open, tiona liza tions of poli tica.l 
a lie,na tion, social loea tio.n (dem agraphic) char act erist i cs of 
the individual, and dissatisE'lction with; government policy. 
After a theoretical discussion :>f ~nomie and aliellation and 
their extensions to political aliellatioB, measures of 
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political cynicism, internal political inefficacy, and 
ex ternal political ineffic:acy are examined with various 
measures of ascribed and achieved individual attribut.es and 
with the perception of policy differences witt, til e Republican 
'ind Democratic Parties. t'iultilT'iriate models 3.re then llsed to 
examine the relative impact of these t·wo set of v3.riables on 
the measures of political alienation. 
THEORIRS OF ANOMIE AID ALIENATIJ! 
One path to an understanding of political. alienation 
begins by an examination of Durkheim's concept o.f "anomie." 
lIan, according to Durkheim, is not satisified Wheil. he 
possesses only those material goods which ensure his 
survival.. Man has unlimited desires for wel.l.-beiag, luxury, 
and pleasure. Being unl.imited, they 
constantly and infinitely surpass t·he means at 
their command; they cannot be quenched. 
Inextinguishable thirst is c:onsantly renewed 
torture. It has been claimed, indeed I that human 
activity aspires beyond assignable limits 3.nd sets 
itself unattainable goalS. But how can sucil an 
undeteLmi.ned state any mOLe be reconciled with the 
conditions of mental life than with the 'iemands of 
physical life? All man's pleasure in acting, 
moving and exerting h~mself implies the sense that 
nis efforts are not in vain and that by walking he 
has advanced" (Durkheim, 1966: 247-248) [1 J. 
[1 JPsyciloloJists call tilis "hedonic relativism:" 
Where pleasure is concerned, hnmans are insatiable 
animals, shifting theiL criteria level or adaption 
level upward when. the level of pleasurable input 
increases, so that ORce 3."ain experience is scored 
as one-third pleasuLe, one-third pain, and 
one-third blah (Campbell,1975:11211. 
Man would always be unhappy were it not for some f3rce 
limiting his passions. only then can "they be harmonized 
with the faculties and satisfied" (Dur:kheim,1966: 248). But 
no Diological forces exist which can limit the passions; 
there must exist some force outside of man which dominates 
l1im. society is this force. Tl1e individual is socialized to 
have certain expectations and to Del1ave in certain ways. 
Under conditions of social stability, society controls and 
regulatoes the needs and desir:es of its citizens. The life 
experiences of the people conform to the expectations 
established by the normative or:der. iiheon crisis occurs, the 
r:egulating norms begin to crumble and life experiences are no 
longer congruent with expectations der:ived from norms 
(Durkheim, 1966: 252). Durkheim defines this phenomenon as 
Merton {19681 adapts some of Durkheim's concepts by 
introducing a model of deviant responses to anomie. 
culturally prescribed goals are not congruent with the means 
for attaining them, anomie becomes prevalent. Merton argues 
that there is a strong emphasis OIl, econol!lic success as a maion 
societal goa 1. Unfortuna tely, there is di fferential access 
to the means to reaching this success. Cultural bias, 
discrlminatlon, lack resources" pre j udi c-~, and 
factors all serve to prevent some peopl~ from re3.ching 
success and slol? tohe process toward success for others. rhis 
"extreme cultural emphasis 011 the goal of success attenuates 
cOllforll\ity to institutionally prescribed methods of moving 
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toward this goal ••• norms aLe Lobbed of theiL powers to 
regulate heha vio.r" (Merton, 1968: 223) • The, anomic situation, 
therefore, "leads to low predicahili ty in heha v iOT, and 
••• maywell lead to the helief in luck" (.Seeman, 1959: 787) • 
Merton continues by deriving a topolog.y based on this 
mea ns-goals disj unction: ><'Q.!!.fQ.£l!~£§' are MlOse who accept both 
the means and goals of society; .hlH!Q!£.!Q.£~ reject the means 
but accept the goals; £.i!!!aJj,§t~ reject the goals but accept 
t he means; !:~!!:ea.l;j,§.t Le ject both the goals and the means; 
and !:~'e.§.!'§. reject both the goals and the means of society, 
but replace them with their own. 
A second starting point toward bhe understanding of 
alienation stems from thell'OrK of l'lal:x. Though tie was mainly 
intel:ested in the wol:ie situation, his ideas may be applied t9 
political alienation (Yingel:, 1973: 177). DUl:kheim sees the 
division of lahor as promoting solidaritr and thus pl:eventing 
anomie; Marx finds it the cause of alienation (Lukes, 
1972:241· 
In capi talistic society. the more the workel: prod uces, 
tn.e more sUl:plus va.lue the capitalist tends to r:ealize; the 
worker does not l:eceive wages equal to the lahor put into the 
prod uets sold. Rathel:, the capitalist gains at tile expense 
of the worker. As his capital gl:OWS, the greatel: his 
domination over the worker The -worker lS 
merely a commodity, his life devalued while the value of his 
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products incceases (Marx,1964;121). M"-n is sepacated from 
his l"-Dor, ilis own products, from other men, and from his 
specles. The product of labor: is the "objectification" of 
labor, labor "embodied in an object" (Jlarx,1844: 108). But 
since he is not compensated in property eqnal to the amount 
of labor ile expends, it follows that the more he expends 
himself, the moce of himself he leaves in the object. Man 
becomes poorer in his "inner life" and belongs less to 
hims.elf. His life no longer belongs to hi.m hut to the object 
he produces (l1arx,1964: 122): 
The alienation of the worker in his product means 
not only-t"hit;--his lahor be,comes an object, an 
g~te~~~l existence, but that it exists Q~~2~i~_~t~, 
independently. as something alien to him, and tlxat 
it becomes a paller on its olin confront.ing him. It 
means that the life which he has conferred on the 
object confronts him as something hostile and 
alien. 
Man .is lowered to an animal state (lIarx.1844:111), alienat.ed 
{ estranged} from everything and everybody. He is not 
involved in the decision of what to prod uC.e or nOli to produce 
it and competition and class hostility make cooperation with 
otuer men difficult if not impossible {OIlman, 1911: 133-134}. 
Life hecomes meaningless and the worker is powerless to 
change his conditioD (1ukes,1912:28). 
Fromm {1955) holds a position on alienation cOl1.sistent 
Vi itt Marx. For Fromm, alienation is selt-estcanJment; man 
does not experlence himself as the center of his 
world, as the creator of his own acts--but his acts 
and their consequences have become his masters; 
whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship 
tFronnn, 1955: 120) • 
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Man does not actively deter:mine his life consequences. 
Rather he is dependent on pOlier outside himself, "un t::> whom 
he has projected his living substance" "(Fromm, 1955: 124). 
[10dern society alienates man fr:::>l!! the work he does, from 
pl"easurable activities, and from the social forces which 
determine society and the people in it (1955:1371. Man and 
society become "atoms, ••• little particles esitr:an'led from each 
other but held together by selfish intecrests and by t:he 
necessity to make use of each other" (1955:139-140). 
conceptual Problems 
Th"eEe has been a major conceptual problem in the study 
of alienation. Aliena nion, a phenomenon of the !..llfLhy';hQJld!J" 
is often confused with anomie, anomia, or anomy, terms which 
properly refer to a §Q£i.~tal conai tion only[ 2]. EmpiDical 
research, until very recently, has not always ser:ved to clear 
this confusion. Srole (1956) and others have attempted t\> 
apply Merton's model in empirical r:esearch using 
social-psychological measures of anolllie[ 3]. But the word 
[2]See Yinger (1973) for discussion. Several studies have 
couf used the anomie-alienation terminology, inc lud.ing 
MCClosky and Schaar (1965a, 1965h) and Srole (1956). 
[3JSrole's (1956) Anomia Scale Oind its variations are often 
used to measure alienation (or anomia, as the scale states). 
schwartz (1973:7) argues that the scale llleasur:es a complex of 
isolation, despair, and powerlessness--indi 'lid uai ra th"er than 
societal attributes. certain methodological prOBLems are 
also associated with the scale: it seelllS t·o measure two polar 
types, nanomia- and "eunomic· r:ather than the continuum as 
Ilsers of the scale imply (Miller and Butler, 1966) • 
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aDom~e is used to describe both a state of society and an 
ind~vidual state, extending the confusion of terminology and 
of conceptualization. Host research has used the social-
psychologica 1 concep tuali zation, the in.di vidual being the 
focus of analysis. Terminology has not advanced with the 
increasing complexity of analysis, however, and several new 
problems have arisen. pirst, we find Gonfusion over what the 
indiv~dual i~ alienated from: society, people, institutions, 
himself? second, this has led to difficulties and 
incodlsistencies in the operationa.lization of alienation. 
Seeman {1959) began to clear some of the confusion by 
reviewing the literature and defining the fi ve most prevalent 
conceptions of al.iena tiion. ~Q.!!.!H:!.§'i>.lm.§.§§ is concei 11 ed as 
"the expectancy or probabilit y held by the indi vidual that 
his own behavior cannot determine the OCGuranGe of the 
outcomes, or re.info.rcemen·ts, he seeks" {1959,784). 
fi~~!Lj,a9.1~~~m§.~~ is where the individual is character~zed by 
ha ving a "loli expectancy that satisfactory predictions about 
the fut·ure outcomes of behavior can be l!lade. IT (1959: 786) • 
liken there is a "h~gh expectancy that socially unapproved 
beha viors a re required to achieve given goals, " t.he 
ind~ vidual is experiencing !!Q;;:l!!l§.~~!!§.§.~. T he fourth type of 
3.liena t.ion is :i§.Ql~!iQll, where a low rewa.rd value is assigned 
to "goals and beliefs that aLe typically highly valued in the 
given society" (1959: 789) • Pinally, we have 
'Where aliena tion i,s the Hdegcee of 
dependence of the given behavioL upon anticipated future 
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rewards" (1959:790) • It refers to the "inability of the 
individual to find self-rewarding ••• a:::tivities that engage 
him" ,1959:790). Much of the past research ~as assumed that 
when oue kind of alienation is measured, the fin:l.ings can be 
generalized to other fonllS of alienatiou[ 4 J. Such 
generalizations ane problemmatic, however. What is .required 
is a "context-specific" approach (Martin ~t 201.,1974) where 
both different dimensions of alienation and their different 
social contexts are analyzed. Dean (1961), Finifter (197Q). 
Real and Rettig ,1963,19671. and Simmons (1966) have all 
found that operationalizations of different aspects of 
alienation are not perfectly cocrelated. 
POLITICAL ALIENATION 
Political cynicism and poli tical in efficacy have 
domi,na ted the empirical lit.erature on political 
alienation[ 5 J. It is from the concept of normlessness that 
political trust is derived. Harmlessness in the political 
sense refers traditionally to distrust .of the political 
system. N ormlessness is "per-cei ve.d" not hy tile indi victual 
feeling anomie, but by the individual seeing freguen·t 
deviation by the government from poli ti cal norms 
[4 ]Por instance, see footnote [3] about 5r-ole '5 Anomie Scale 
and its failur-e to differentiate between se'12!:al dimensions 
of aliena tion. 
[5 ]Political sel.f estrangement runs a fairly :::lose third; see 
Schacht (1970) and Schwartz {1973}. One reason for the 
domination by trust and eff_icacy is the availahl,ity of the 
SEC/CPS American National Election Studies, whose higl;t 
quality data includes questions tapping these two forms of 
political alienation. 
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(Finifter, 1970: 396). political trust is thus "the belief 
tha t the government is operating according to. one's norma ti ve 
expectations of how government should function" (t1iller-, 
1974b:989) • 
The concept of political inefficacy has two dimensic)lls. 
derivable from Seeman's definition of powerlessness. Nl.e 
politically inefficacious individual feels he cannot 
influence the actions of the gover-nment., t)J.a t he has low 
"perso.nal feelings of political competence" 
(Converse, 1972:334). political decisioJls are made 
independent of any actions the individual may take {Easto,n 
il!.~ffi£i!£y' is the second form and refers to .. tr-ust in system 
responsi venessH (Converse,1972:334). Government officials 
care little about how a citizen feels; r.ather they are only 
interested in being in power: 
As a no.rm it refers to bne bime.less theme of 
democra tic theory that members of a democra bic 
regime oughb to regard those who occupy positions 
of political autholCity as responsive agents and 
tl1ab the members themselves ought to be disposed to 
palCtici pa te in the l1onors and offices of the system 
(Easton and Dennis, 1967:26). 
TheS,e two dimensions are analogous to the distinction drawn 
in the attitude tlleolCY literature nebYieen t,he cognitive and 
evaluabive (affective) components of att,it,udes: 
Tile fonner is a probability dimension and refers to 
beliefs about the probability of unprobability that 
a particular object or relationship exists. The 
latter is an evaluation of the 
rela tions.hi p-- whether it is good 






The internally inefficacious says, "I cannot influenc.e the 
gov,ernment. ff The externally inefficacious says, "The 
government fails to listen to me." This distiction has 
rarely been made in the literature, but lllay be important fo.r 
understanding political alienation[6]. Schwartz (1973: 13) 
suggests that many Americans are orien ted more toward the 
po.litical system than toward their personal participation, a 
hypothesis that can only be tested by ma,king the distincti.on 
between internal and external inefficacy. More recently,. 
Ab.erbach {1977} found that blac.ks were more likely to blame 
personal failure or inadequacies as sources of power 
dissatisfcation than whites, while whites were more willing 
to blame the um:esponsiveness of government insti'tutiollS. A 
SOmewhat fine distiction must be made between cynicism and 
the ,two efficacies. Political cynicism occurs when a peLson 
sees the 'J ovel:nment not following political norms; the 
goveD.ll.ment cannot be trusted to do rig;ht, it abuses it 
powers. This perhaps can he called a stLnctnr al 
chal:actel:istic. External political inefficacy is more 
procedural; there is too much red- tape, preventing the 
individual from influencing the government. Both cynicism 
and eKtel:nal inefficacy use tn.e government or political 
[6]Easton and Dennis (1967) also identify a thil:d form of 
efficacy: conduct. 'The efficacious person is one who 
actually call. ill.fluence his political destiny. 
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system as a reference point; internal political inef£icacy 
ioes not[ 7 ]. 
The possible causes o£ political alienation are many, 
but arrange themselves in three main categories: social 
location variables, psychologica 1 f ac-t-a"L 5, and policy 
dissatisfaction. Persons of low social sta tus--the young or 
very old, the poor:. minorities, \fIomen, the uneducated--all 
have received a fair: amount of attennion in the literature. 
These factors follow from Berton's notiou, of the disjunctive 
!:elationship between goals and means. Because of 
discriminatiop, lack of resources, lack of experience in the 
political system, and the inability to comprehend. the 
intricacies of social, political, and economic 
interrelationships (because of 1011 degrees of education), 
individuals are not able to integrate into the social syst,em 
completely enough to achieve the goals societ,y emphasises. 
The means to those goa,ls are just not available through 
normal channels. The seuse of political power lessness 
increases directly because of this. Political cynicism may 
or may not increase, however. since inefficacy co,uld be 
related to a lack of interest in and a neutral attitude 
[7 ]It is rather simplistic to separate the concept of 
alienation into seemingly distinct dimensions. Each 
di mension is rela ted to the others, theoretically and 
quantitatively. For instance, there are norms governing the 
process by which demandS are introduced into the political 
system.. A sense of powerlesness iliay "he personal, or may 
refer to t,he perception of normCLessness (Easton, 1965: 2(0) • 
Inefficacy may even lead to distrust of the gove!:nment, a,t 
least in specified situations. 
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toward the political system. Or. while a person may feel 
personally inefficacious, he rna y believe that one or more of 
his reference groups will "attain his values for him" 
(Sch wartz, 1973: 13)( 8]. 
1'iCCloskey and Schaar c{1965a) study the the psycilOlogical 
dimensions of alienation ,what tbey call Ranomy") and find 
that cognitive and personality factors such as bostility, 
anxiety, inflexible defensiveness, and intoleran:ce of others 
are rela ted to increased alienation. Rosenherg (1956) fonnd 
that a low faith in people was related to a lack of trust in 
political representatives. Little work has heen done wbich 
directly relates political measures of alienaticon witl, 
totally psychological variahles, however. 
Recently, a new emphasis has beeR put on political 
factors as determinants of attitudes toward the political 
system, inclUding efficacy and trust in the government[ 9]. 
Gamson (1968: 178l states the trust in gove.rnment is affected 
by the nature of the political decisions made and 
sa tisfaction or dissatisfaction with them .. Miller 
(1974a,1974b), Citrin (1974l, and House and !'jason (1975) al.l 
found that persons with high political cycnicism are also 
inclined to be dissatisfied with government policy or to, feel 
[8]Though this seems unlikely, given that people of lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds tend not to belong to voluntary 
associations or to be very active in political organizations 
and parties. See Verba and !He {1972: Chapter 11). 
[9JSee Citrin (1974); Easton (1965); Gamson (19681; House and 
l1ason (1975); Mill.er (1974a, 197401; and Schwartz (1973). 
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that the posi tions held by the major political parties tend 
to be distant from their own positions. 
Several studies have used composite measures of 
political alienation, combining t,wo or more of the dimensions 
defined by Seeman (1959). As with the study of alienation, 
such composine measures are to be avoided at all, costs. 
Aberbach (1969:89) provides a eloquent summary of the 
reasons: 
••• using all ;!::Ll!Q£ composite to measure political 
alienation is self-defeating and lea ves unanswered 
a series of nagging questions. Just, how are the 
indicators related? Which part of the composite 
index is causing the relationship described or. 
better, how does each indicator relate to the 
various depelldent var:iablesl perhaps th.ey operate 
in the same w,ay, maybe only one plays a significan t 
role, or per:haps there are interesting interactions 
netReen the indica tors which ar:e significant 
theoretically and empiLically. 
A major fault in the literature on political alienation 
has been the laCK of a long term trend study. Have the 
factors affecting political alienation changed over: time? 
Are social background factors consistently related in 
direction and strength with po.litical ali?nation over: a 
per:iod of yeal:s? Do attitudes related to political 
alicenation change, fl:om weakly related in time t=1 t.o 
strongly I:elated in time t=1+ n, or vice veLsa ?Are the 
causes 01: corLelates of different dimensions of political 
alienation the sante or d.ifferent? R second se"t of problems 
concerns sample and lllehhodological problems. Much of the 
\-
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past research has used small local samples, noncomparahle 
measures, and little multivaLiate analysis. consequently, 
the results of maI\Y studies are not generalizable or 
contradict the f.indings of others tsee Wright, 1976: :::hapte'I: 
3). The present study's use of high quality national. survey 
data and fairly sophisticated methodology, along with atcend 
orientation, attempts to overcome some of these deficiencies. 
16 
THE DATA, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS 
The Survey Research :enter/Center for Political studies 
American National Election studies for the years 1952, 1956, 
1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970 ,1972, 1974, and 1976 are be 
used to assess the changing effects of social status and 
policy dissatisfaction variables on trust in governmeRt and 
in ternal aRd external political efficacy[ 1 0]. 
Thre-e scales were created to measure political 
alienation: Trust in Government, Internal poLitical Efficacy, 
and ExteLnal political Efficacy scales. Toe full set of 
questions fOL each scale were asked only in certain years. 
The trust scale was created for 1958, 1964, 1968, 1970, 1972, 
1974, and 1976. The internal polical efficacy scale was 
crea"ted for the ten years of 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1966. 
1968. 1970, ,972. 1974, and 1976. The complete set of 
queskions for the exte"rnal political efficacy scale weLe no"t 
asked until 1968; only the years 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, and 
1976 are included. 
[10]The data utilized in this paper we:re Illade available by 
the Inter-Universiiy ConsortiUm for Political and Social 
Resea:rch. Ne.ither the original collectors o:f the data nor 
the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analysis or 
in terpretatio.ns presented /tere. 
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The Trust in Government scale was created from the 
following questions (cynical responses in:l.icated by 
asterik); 
Do you think that people in the government waste a 
lot of money we pay in taxes., waste some of it, or 
don't waste ver:y much of it? 
How much of the time do you think you can trust the 
gover:~.ent in Washington to do what is right--just 
a.bout always, most of the time, o.r only some of the 
time*?[ 11 ] 
Would you say the governmen·t is pretty much rnn by 
a few big inter:ests looking out for themseLves. or 
that it is ruu for: the benefit of all the people? 
Do you think that almost all of the 
the gov €rnment are smart people, 
that guite a few of them don't seem 
they ar:e doing*? 
people r:unning 
or do you think 
to know what 
Do you think that guite a few of the people running 
the government are crooked., not very many are, or 
do you think that har:dly any of them are crooked? 
an 
The scale was created by counting the number: at cynical 
responses over the five questions. Respondents with more 
than tliO items of miSSing data 'Aer:e eliminated from the 
analysis[ 12]. The scale 1:21 nge s from zer.o ·(low cynicis mj to 
[11 jA fourth category I:esponse is also used: "None of the 
time. n This lias never offered as a choice hut was 
volunteered by respondents. Por purposes of analysis, this 
response was combined with the "Some of the time" r:esponses. 
[ 12 ]Very feli respondents were elimina ted because of missing 
data. Some variables with highly skewed distributions (e.g., 
race). required that as many cases be availab1e as possible. 
l'he overall tendency of inclusion of som,e missing data is a 
sl:ight conservative bias since scores of ::iily respondents 
having missing data could never reach the maximum poss1.ble 
alienation score. Missing data in the following two scales 
can similarily be evaluated. 
18 
five (high cynicism). Guttman scale analysis is presented in 
Tahle 1. As can he seen, the five variables rarely formed an 
acceptahle Guttman scale, defined as ha ving a coefficient of 
reproducability of at least .90 and a coeffici·ent of 
sca.lahility of .60 or better. This is at variance with 
other research using the same data. Miller (1974a) reports 
reproducibility coeff.icients greater than .90 for 1964, 1966, 
1968, and 1970. He toek a more liberal approach in 
constructing his scales, however. Not only did he eliminate 
respondents with more than two items of missing data, but he 
also eliminated all who had more than 10'00 errors in the 
Guttman scale, thus guaranteeing a higher than normal 
reproducibili,ty coefficient. His results, therefore are 
perhaps a little less generalizahle. 
The in10ernal political inefficacy scale was created by 
counting the number of RAgree fl (alienated) responses to the 
foll,owing three questions: 
People like me don't have any say anout what the 
government does. 
Voting is the only way that people like me can have 
any say about how the government runs things'. 
Sometimes politics and 
complica ted that· a person 
understand wha t 's going on. 
gov,ernment seem so 
like me can't really 
One item of missing data' was allo1Wed per respondent.. The 
scale ranges :from zero (high effie acyl to three {low 
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afficacy--hig,n inefficac yj • Guttman scale scores are 
presented in Table 1. 
Finally, the external political inefficacy scale was 
constructed by counting the number of "Agree" responses. to 
the following three questions: 
I don't think public officials care much about what 




speaking I those we elect to Congress in 
lose touch witb the people pretty 
Parties are only interested in people's votes but, 
not in thei r opinions. 
A gain, one item of 11I.issing data was allowed, and the sea le 
runs from zero (high efficacy) to three (lo<l efficacy--high 
inefficacy). Table 1 presents Guttman scale scores for each 
year. 
The efficacy scales share a coml1lon problem: botb are 
susceptible to acquiescence. In any pop ula tion I some 
proportion is going to agree with an item regardless of .i ts 
content. Acquiescence is less of a problem when half of the 
items are reversed, since this ca uses acquiescers to be 
assigned to the midpoint of the scale where tttere is a 
minimum of influence on statistical analysis (Wright, 
1976:95). Wright (1976) studied acquiescent responses to ;the 
internal inefficacy items and the ext'Brnal "don't think 
public officials care" question in the 1968 SEC election 
study. Be concludes that acquiescence can safely be ignoced, 
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although he uses no fixed criteria by which his results can 
be compared (wright, 1976:100) (13 J. 
TRENDS IN CYNICISM AND INEFFICACY 
It has already been showl! in much past research that 
political cynicism has risen in the past twenty years. This 
may have to do with the increasing issue constEaint 
characted_zing the public. Citizens alre no longer the 
passive uninformed, ind,ividuals Campbell ~~ ~l,,- (1960) f3und, 
in the late fifties. Rather, issues have been much more 
salient, especially with the advent of the Vietnam w,ar, the 
civil rights movement, recession, and urban blight, among 
atne liS {see Miller and Levitin, 1976), and the 
pali.tically involved have more coheJ:ent political views {Nie 
~~ i!1 ... , 1976; 283) • People are more interested in examining 
the issues. Since more is known about each iss.ue, more can 
be found to disagree with, increasing dissatisfaction and 
cynic.ism. 
Trends in internal inefficacy are much more difficult tq 
determine theoretically. It has probably remained fairly 
constant over the years, although "With t/,e. black 
[1.3]Wright (1976:110) presents e1Tloence that the reliahility, 
homogeneity, and internal consistency of the trust and 
efficacy scales are average or slightly netter than average 
for scales of the same type. FIe also concludes that each 
scale is sufficiently valid and that they are distinctly 
different .from analogous personality ffieasures~ He uses da-ta 
from the SRe 1966 and 1968 election studies only, however. 
See Robinson §t i!!... (1968) and Robinson and Shaver {1969l 
for di·scussion of alternative measures of political 
alienation. 
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consciousness movement and the increasing politi:ci.zation of 
women recently we may find an overall increase in personal 
efficacy. 
historical 
Externa.l inefficicy should vary wi til tihe 
context; Government responsiveness should b" 
perceived, as higher during election years than during off 
years. canidates are more willing to shape policy to suit 
their cORstitu·ents when they face .re-election than. when t.heir 
incumbancy istempora rily assured. Voting requires the least 
aillount of effort an the part of the indiviCLual but creates 
tangible retUl:llS almost immediately; someone is elected. 
This reaffirms the individu·al' s perception 
constitutlional right to participate in government. 
of his 
The mean levels of the three political alienation scales 
by y.l"ar are presented in Table 2. Political cynicism shows a 
monotonic increase between 1964 and 1976,. and has leveled 
somewbat between 1974 and 1976 after a big jump between 1972 
and 1974. This large increase after 1972 is probably due to 
watergate a,nd the resignation of the two top public 
executives in the United states. Government misconduct was 
no longer abstract; here was tangible evidence tbat things 
were not right. 
Internal inefficacy shows no consistent trend. Ther" 
perhaps is a slight tendency for middle or low range efficacy 
scores to occu ][ during election years, but any conClusion 
would be equi vocable. Externa 1 inefficacy. however, was 
consistently lower during election years than off-election 
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years. As was expected, people feel the goverllment is more 
responsive during election ye3.rs, when canidates must cater 
to public opinion. 
POLITICAL ALIENATION ANl} SOCIAL LOCATION 
Hypothesized Effects of Race, Sex, Education, 
Income, And Social class 
This section discusses some of· t·he reasons social 
loca tion variables such as sex# education,income, social 
class, and race should be related to political alienatipn. 
It should be stressed that tlle different dimensions of 
poli tical aliena tiOll! {cynicism, internal inefficacy, and 
external inefficacy) l1la y not be rela ted to the same variables 
in the samell/ay. Some specification should be expected to 
occur .. 
persons who occupy lower status positions in society are 
often .. denied access to full participa tioIl; in social· life" 
(Ols,en, 1969:295) • liomen, blacks, the poor, and the 
uneducated are disadvantaged i.n social, economic, and 
poli,tical opportunities. Sex should not be related to 
cynicism or external inef.f icacy. Men and wome,. generally 
experience the some socialization processes leading to 
support of tjJ.e government and the learning 0.£ political 
norms" other socialization processes do create sex role 
differences, however. Women have tra,ditionally held a 
submissive political role in a society dominated by men. 
They have not been adequately socialized with a sense of 
\-
personal political competence 
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(;Campbell §.t i!!..!..1 1960: 490j. 
Males have the political experience. women, until very 
recently, have never been involved im. formal mainline 
politics in large numbers. only now are they even heginning 
to have a major illlpact on the crea tion of government pOlicy 
or its administration. Thus internal political inefficacy 
lllay very well he associatedlilith sex. ·Women should have a 
heightened sellse of personal politica 1 inadequecy; they 
should have a higher level of internal inefficacy than males. 
House and Mason (1975:132) document the educational 
upgrading of educa tioR in the United States "exesting 
downward pressure on alienation in the 1960s," though 
historical events cnnteracted the pressure to mate alienation 
inccease. A manifest (and latent) .function of the 
educational system in the United States {and in all other 
countries as well} has been to instill social and po1i·tical 
norms into children. Easton and Dennis (1967) argue tha.t 
acgu.isit.ion of these norms at an early and illjpressionable age 
may offset any adult tendency to feel ine.fficacious[ 14]. 
In-creasing education Lncreases cogni tive abilit.y. 
Persons '.ith low levels of educa tion find it difficult to 
"organize and understand the events and ideas they encounter" 
because their minds lack "power and efficiency" {McClosky and 
[14]Ouce a man enters the work force, however, JOD experien,ce 
rna y hecome more important in deter mining a person l s social 
and political attitudes than early socialization experiences 
{Abramson and 3rooks,1971). Type of occupation "largely 
determines [a person's] peers, his author:ity relationships, 
his secur: it y, and his inco me" (1971: 404) • 
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Schaar, 1965a:21). This "difficulty apparently produces, noet 
security and confidence, but bewilderment and anxiety." 
people who cannot organize soci"l and political information 
tend to be confused about societ y' s v"lues and norms and thus 
tend to see society as lacking in order and meaning 
(McCloskey and Schaar,1965a:21). This in turn leads to 
powerlessness and distrust of the poli tiea 1 system. 
Income brings with it increased resources to influence 
the government. Money is power. Persons with higher incomes 
do not have to wonder where their next meal is going to come 
from, nor do they need to worry about unemployment 
compensatlion and welfare aid (except from the standpoint of 
how much tax money it is costing them). Welfare is a much 
more salient issue to the poor than to the wealt!ty; 
government red tape is bound to cause dissatisfaction. 
Perhaps more important is a sense of relative depr:ivai>ion. 
The poor see themse.lves getting poorer as the r:ich gel: 
richer, and Illal1le the government for: the u.nequal distribution 
of wealth in the united states, we would thus expect higher 
political cynicism levels for lower icncol1le per:sons. 
Because poor:er people ha ve less r:esource, they are 
actually less able to influence the gover:nment. This in tuen 
should lead to their having lower levels of 
efficacy. Similarily. since the goveenment c"n be seen as 
unr:esponsive to their needs, the less wealthy should also 
IH ve a higher level of exter:nal inefficacy than the wealthy. 
Subjective social class is a composite measure of 
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i ncoll!e, education, and occnpa tion. Its impOl:tance is that it 
measures a relative sense of well being. Lower SES persons 
ma y te,nd to see the worlii as a threa tening place and be 
predisposed toward ceEtain stands on social and political 
issues {Horton and Thompson, 196 2} • People may feel tney 
belong in a higher or lower socia,l class than they actually 
do, influencing their level of political alienation. Middle 
c,lass persons should be less cynical and more efficacious 
than working class people. Higher class people have more 
access to the govermment, especially since govern!!!e n-t 
officials tend to come from the middle and upper classes 
ra ther than ,the lower oues. These officials are more in tune 
with the needs and desires of the upper classs; their Ijeeds 
and desires are cong,ruent. Middle and upper class persons 
have lljm:e incemes and education generally. They have more 
resources to influence the goVel:I\meIlt and a greater amount of 
knowledge to implement those resources to satisfy their 
Race should he related to all three dimensions of 
political alienation. It has been documented that hlacks 
were less cynical than whi,tes before the late sixties but 
became maLe cynical in the early seventies. The government 
has symbolized black> interests in the past: 
It won hi!!! freedom, gave hi m the hest treatment he 
received in his worst days in the South, provided a 
measure of relief in the Depression and the 
difficult periods that followed, and has done the 
most to seeliDe his rights and protect him during 
the contemporary struggle for equality (Aherbach 
and lalker/1g73:12~. 
But Lisinq expectations caused by rising levels of education 
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and by actual political gains by blacks (see Wilson,1978) 
have led to increasing feelings of rela ti ve deprivation 
(Aberbach and Walker, 1973) • Distrnst in the government 
became a way of "rejecting the traditional sense of 
de p.endency " on white friends and allies {Aberbach and 
Walker,1973: 126). Two factors, the great increases in i:ncome 
and education, may add or subtract from the effect of 
cynic.ism. First, education may have made blacks more aware 
of their plig,ht or more empathetic towaLd black political and 
social groups and thus more cynical in the seventies 
(Aberbach and Nalker,1973: 196-197). But, rising income may 
have placated many blacks. As they enter into the middle 
class they are likely to desire security for their n.ew-fouud 
wealctb[ 15]. The result may be an economically conservative 
black middle class, a group more z:eceptive and suppoz:ti ve of 
consez:vative government policy. 
Blacks .have had little peLsona 1 poli tical powez: and 
little ability to influence the government (see 
Middleton, 1963) • Historically, the govern me nt has no t. been 
ove£,ly receptive to black, influence, except in cases where 
th.eir vote was necessary to win an election. 'rile goveLnment 
has not been responsive to black needs on a large sca;le, at 
least until recently. We would expect blacks to have a lower 
sense of internal and external political efficacy than 
whites. Personal power may have risen for blacks since the 
(15]Wattenberg (1974) takes this 
time in hist.ory, the majority of 
class and many are not eager to 
which may thLeaten their status. 
position. Por 






late sixties, if the rise in black activism can b,e used as a 
rough measure. Trends in external inefficacy are more 
in,definite; whether it has risen or not depends on whether 
blacks have seen the government responding tothe.ir increased 
acti v.ism. Both efficacies may be in part explained by bhe 
differenHal educational levels of blacks and whites. Blacks 
as a group have a lower educational lev.el bhan whibes. 
Consequenbly, since people wibk more education are more 
ef.ficacious, the difference between blacks andwhibes may he 
due to differ.ences in educabion on,ly. 
Results: Social Location and Polibical Alienation 
Sex and its relationship to political alienation is 
examined first. Thece have been no consistent di£ferences 
between males and females in their level on cynicism and 
extecnal inefficacy (Figures 1 and 2)[ 16]. Eta is never 
higher than .<:8 and usually much lower. In Figure 3, 
however, a difference does occur. Females are consistently 
more likely to feel internally inefficacious than, males, with 
the association varying in stcengthfrom .015 to .144. 
(16]Gcaphs aJ:e presented instead of tables because they ace 
much easier for the J:eader to interpret;. The actual data, 
including lis areJ:eported in the Appendix. 
Eta is USEd throughout the present st1.hdy because it does 
not make assul1lptions about linear relationships between 
variables and bEcause it can be used with nominal, ordill.al, 
and inter:val level independent vaciables. It does cequh:e 
interval level dependent variables, an assumption fullfilled 
by the tJ'lree political aliena tion scales. "here tJ'le 
assocation is overly larg'e because o£ extreme curvil;eari t Y # 
Pearson's r is also presented; Eta and r are directly 
comparable (Loether and ~cTavish,1974:251). Eta varies from 
o to +1 and dOES not Show direction. 
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Females are more likely to blame their lack of political 
efficacy on their personal inadequecies ·than men, probably 
because of th.e "lower class" status into which they have been 
socialized. 
Race presents some interesting contrasts. Before 197 (}, 
blacks were less cynical than "!lites (Figure 4i. In 1970, 
blacks experienced a great increase in cynicism, rising above 
the cynicism level of whites ("ho also experienced a so.me"hat 
less sharp incr:ease in cynicism). Betcween 1968 and 1970, 
ma jor events took place which may be responsible for: this 
revensal of trust in the. gover:nment. The Ci vii Rights hcts 
in the sixties gneatly r:oused hopes in blacks of a mor:e 
nacially egalitanian society. These hopes br:ought wi,th them 
incr:eased demands on the gover:nment. But the gover:nment was 
not nesponsive enough to satisfy mino.rites. !'lany o.f the 
racial niotsin the late sixties wene caused or: nourished by 
the frustration blacks were feeling. Between 1974 and 1976. 
cyniCism seems to have leveled somewhat, with afain.ly 
consistent difference betweem whites and blacks lEta; = .071 
and .076 in 1974 and 1976, nespectively). 
Though the relationship between cynicism and race 
changes in dir:€cticn, the rela tienship betW'een internal and 
extennal inefficacy and race remains consistent over the 
years, at least until (Figures 5 and 6)" Blacks have 
always felt more personally ineffective and also evaluate bhe 
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poli,tical system as unresponsive to their influence. In 
1976, however, t,nese differences seem to wash out; there, is 
almost no difference between the two races. 1976 saw a more 
peacefu:!. political atmosphere with the ele ction of Democr at 
Jimmy Carter to the presidency. Since the vast majority of 
blacks are Democrats and because Carter appealed to minocity 
groups, blacks may have fe It that the government would be 
more receptive to their influence. 
Before 1970, education lias slightly related to cynicism, 
with the hig,her educal;,ed persons tending to be more tcustful 
(FigUre 7). T,ne major exception was college graduates, who 
tended to be a little more cynical than lower educate 
persons. By 1970 the relatiollshi p st aM lizes: all 
educational groups becoming more cynical, with the more 
highly educated being the most trustful. Eta is never higher 
than a moderate .166, however. 
Education has beel;! h,ighly related to the two efficacy 
measures, how,ever (Figure 8 and 9). As Campbell §l;. !!1.!. 
(196q) first found and later emirical literature c.onsisten,tly 
supp.orted, the higher the level .of edUcation, the higher the 
feeling of powerfulness, alth.ough the difference between 
persons with an eigth grade education or less and pel:sons 
with some high school backgr.ound tends to merge in 1976. 
Education is a far better predictor of efficacy than of 
trust. 
Certain problems "ere encountered with the measurement 
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of income. The sac/cps election studies used seven differ:ent 
coding systems between 1952 and 1976 to measure income. 
Secondly, the value of the dollar has charrged radicall;y since 
1952. 1\ dollar l.n 1979[171 was worth $2.57 in 1952. An 
attempt was made to transform the different coding forms into 
standard 1979 dollars but tile resulting incol/le intervals were 
too ungainly and crude to use as valid indicators of income, 
even if recoded. Therefore, respondents were divided into 
guintiles, giving a .r:ough income compa r:abili ty over the years 
studied[18] • 
.Income is a somewhat irrconsistent predictor of political 
cyn:icism (Figure 10). There is a tendency for: cynicism to 
rise as income drGPs; the r:elationship is not very str:ong, 
howe1l'er • Only in 1974 is the r:ela tionsh ip completely 
.Income is a fairly strong predictor of both internal and 
external. inefficacy (F igures 11 and 12). Eta is never 10 wer 
than .211 until 1976 for internal inefficacy and usually much 
higher. The inverse relati.anship between internal inefficacy 
and income is monotonic for: all years except 1966. In 1976 
[17]'J!ile January, 1979 consumer price index value of .489iifas 
used to adjust income into 1979 dollars (U.S. Bur,eau of 
Census,197B:!!82; U.S. Bureau of census,1979:4821. 
[ 18 ]There is at least one major problem wi til this method. 
Actl1al gains _have bee:q made in income due to the rising 
standard of living in the Ullited states, even after 
standardizing income. Income as measured here does not take 
this change into account. 
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it does lose scme of its predictive value; all persons seem 
to become Illore efficacious, with a greater increase in 
efficacy for those in the lower 
inefficacy exhibits the same 






seem to be 1110re 
inefficacious than the middle income group, but this 
difterence is li€ry slight and does not detract si gni.fican t ly 
from the overall relationship. 
The working class are consistently mo.re likely to be 
personally powerless 'Figure 13) and to blame the political 
system for their powerlessness (Figure 14) than the middle 
class. Except for 1964, they are also more likely to be 
cynical toward the government, though the relationships are 
not as strong as they are for the ef.ficacy measures (Fig.uTe 
15) • 
A SUlllmary on the Effects of Socia.l Loca tion 
In summaEY. t,he data show than social location variables 
to some extent determin.e levels of political alienation, but 
that the level at which predictive power is found is 
dependent o.n how political alienation is measured. CyniCism, 
internal inefficacy, and external inefficaccy liere all related 
to education. Its predictive power was much higher for the 
efficacy measures, hOliever. Likewise, income was a much 
b-etter predictor of the eff,icacies -tItan i't~ was of -cyniCism .. 
Race did haVe some predictive value, though. at a lower: level 
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than one might have expected. Race llad a consistent 
relationship wi th the two efficac y mea sure s over the years; 
blacks were always less efficacious. The cynicism-race 
re1a tionsliip is h~istorica1ly hound, however. The reversal 
from higher white 
dependent on the 
cynicism to higher 
historical context. 
hlack cynicism is 
Sex was found to he 
unrela ted to cynicism and exteJ:nal inefficac y, hut associa ted 
with internal inefficacy; females were personally more 
powerless than males. And f inalhy, socia I class was 
consiste nt over the yeaJ:s in predicting eacll of the illeasures 
of political aliena tion. 
}. couple points should be noted. As House and ilasolt 
slim;. cynicism seems to vary equally across !lte~asuJ:es of 
social location over time, the exception being race. This 
illay indicate that rising levels of cynicism may he better 
explained hy scme other set a va1:iables. The next section 
provides evidenGe that policy dissatisfaction does explain 
some of this variation. 
political efficacy, however, has Eeillained at a 
relati vely constant level Oller: the years. Its r:elationsnip 
to policy dissatisfaction will also be explored to determine 
if polict dissatisfaction can provide a fuller explanation of 
inefficacy. 
POLITICAL ALIENATION AND POLICY D,ISSATISFACTION 
Trust in the political system begins to decline when the 
/ 
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genenal citizenry sees a growing se t of related and 
undesirable policy outcomes. Mistrust of authorities may be 
the first step toward mistrust of the political system. .lIs 
the number of actual or perceived negative outcomes 
in creases_, the view that all authority is biased against the 
pU.blic may emerge[ 19 J. With eroding support, first 
demands could not be processed into 
outputs ••• Second I without support it would be 
impossible to assume some k.ind of stability in the 
rules and structure through the use of wh.ich 
demands are converted into outputs ••• And third, 
support is vital in order to maintain minidllal 
cohesion within ••• [the] polit.ical commun.ity 
(Easton, 1965: 157). 
An increase in "negative votingn may occur, where people vote 
not for a particular candidate or issue, but agaillst the 
lesser of two evils {JI.berbach,1969: 99[20 j. This may slowly 
lead to the concclusion that even the political and social 
institutions are a source of bia s. Dissatisfaction may reach 
snch a level that the political cOIl!1llu,ni ty may desir.e 
separation from the political institutions with Which it is 
unhappy (Gamson, 1968: 51-52) [21]. 
[ 19 ]And distrust> is likely to cr:ea"be more distrust beca use of 
numerous feedback loops which generate trust and distrust 
(Aber:bach and lalter,1970:12021. Once a person begins to see 
the world ina cer:tain perspective (i. e., with mistrust), he 
places hilllse If in a "new political and per:sona 1 communiccation 
structure which mal' reinforce his alienation" 
(Schwartz,1973:161). 
[20]llso see Levin (1960); Levin and Eden (1962:55}; McDill 
and Ridley (1962: 207); and Templeton (1966). 
[21 ]For instance, alienation has been found to be 
significantly associated with mass movements qnd 
re volutionary aati vity (Kornha user, 1963) and with campus 
protest activities (Clark and Bgan,1972). 
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In the 1970, 1972, 1974 # and 1976 SRCICPS election 
surveys, respondents were asked to place themselves and the 
two major political parties on several seven-point issue 
continuums. A measure o.f policy dissatisfaction for each 
r€spondent was created by computing the the absolute 
difference between the respondent' s position OJl each issue 
scale and the sca.le position associated with each of the 
parties. A value of zero indicates no dif ference between the 
respondent's position and the position represented by tI,e 
party. A ma.ximum policy dissatisfact,ion score of six 
indicates the repondent has placed the party at one extreme 
of the scale and himself a·t the other. 
An average measure of policy dissatisfaction was created 
by summing the distance scores over all variables far each 
year and dividing by the number of questions (fractions were 
rounded). This average measure is more parsimonious than 
using each individual guestion and may capture cumulatiVe 
effects of dissatisfaction across the several issues (See 
Mill,er,1974a:965). A disadvantage of this meaSlH;e is that it 
dOeS not allow us to evaluate the rela ti ve streng ths of the 
issue guestions[ 22]. 
[22]lIiller (1S74a:9651 also claims that the average measure 
c-orr:ela'tes at a someWhat lower value, at least with measunes 
of political cynicism, than do the individual issue 
questions. This conservative bias is not necessarily had, 
how.ever. 
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Political Cynicism and Policy Dissatisfaction 
[1ean cynicism values by average distance from the 
Republican Party are presented in Table 3a for the total 
cross-section, white Democrats, black Democrats, Republicans, 
and Independents[23]. The cross-section, white Democrats, 
and black Democrats all experience a monotonic increase in 
cynicism as the average distance f.rom Republicall policy 
increases. The 3.9 percent who were least distant had a mean 
cynicism of only 1.77, while those who were most distant had 
a value of 4.21. For white Democrats., the cynicism level 
changed from 1.il9 to 3.42 as one moves from least to most 
distant. cynic.ism for black Democrats increased from 1.33 to 
4.ao. 
Republicans and independents show almost monotonic 
relationships except for those persons least distant from the 
preceived Republican policy position. This may be due to the 
low number of people in the category, or lIlay indicate a 
slight dissatisfaction with the number of policies being 
carried out by the government. Citizens who find their 
position on issue questions congruent with those of Oll.e of 
the major parties lilay he lIlore aware that problems prevent 
those policies fnom being implemented {e.g., President Nixon 
unable to pass legislation thcough a Congress contnolled by 
the oppos.ing Democnatic Party). The Republicans and 
(23)Republicans wene not 
blacks are Republican. 
toward the Democnatic or 
divided by race because so few 
Independents inc.lude those uho lean 
Republican Parties. 
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independents gen€rally show an increase in pplitical cynicism 
with incr;easLng distance from the perceived Republican Party 
position, however. The most alienated persons seem to be the 
black Democrats, white Democrats, and independents (gr au p 
means of 2.51, 2.47, and 2.45, respectivelyl. RepublLcans 
are the least alienated. All of the relationShips are fairly 
strong (Eta:. 29 or ll!ore} except :for: the Republicans (Eta: 
.15) • 
The same relationships occur when one looks at tae mean 
cynicism levels by average distance from the Democratic Party 
(Table 3b). 
tae total 
political cynicism increases 
cross-section {from 2.11 to 
monotonically for 
3.151. for white 
Democrats (from 2.15 to 3.71), and for bla.ck Democrats (from 
2.01 to 3.C9). The relationships for Republioans and 
independents in again slightly curvilinear. Repub.licans 
least d:Lstant from the Democratic position had a mean score 
of 2.00. Thpse next least cynical had a mean sco;re .28 lower 
in value. After ·that, as distance increases, so does 
cynicism. Black and white Democrats and independents were 
again the most cynical (group means of 2.51, 2. 1 7, and 2.47, 
respectively). The Eta values were much lower , however. The 
relationship is stronger for distance frolll the Republican 
Party than fpr distance from the Democratic Party, except in 
the case of Republicans. 
.In the relationships between policy 
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dissatisfaction and cynicism. had changed somewhat, hut thB 
overall rela tionship of increasing poli tical cynicism wi th 
increasing policy distance still held. This time, it was tlle 
total cross-section, the Republicans, and the independents 
who showed monotonic increases in cynicism as di,stance from 
the Republican Party increased fTable 4a). WIlLte and black 
Democr3.ts show a slightly curvilinear relationship. For 
10 hite Democ Eats, the difference betcween those least distant 
and those next least distant is so small 
curvilinearity can 
Republican policy for 
cynical tkhan those 
be ignored. Those 
hlack De mocra ts 
next most distance. 
(.01) that their 
distant from most 
were slightly less 
the small number 0.£ Black Democrats ua Villg 
This may be d'ue to 
a l;arge policy 
difference. As in 1970, Republicans as a whole were less 
cynical (group mean is 2.56) 
and the independents. One 
thall the two Democratic groups 
should notice, however, the 
increase ill cynicism for each group hetween 1970 and 1976. 
The mean cynicism level for the total cross-section rose .59; 
for: White Democrats, it increased hy .63; for black 
Democrats, hy.61; and by .44 and .69 for Republicans alld 
independellts. These findings uphold the earlier work of 
Miller {1974a; 197 1+.h) and House and !'lason (1975) W.110 found 
that the "g.r:owing discrepencies between the attitudes of the 
electorate and the trend of political policies and events" 
have led to escalated political cynicism levels (House and 
"ason,'975:1q3-144)~ The rise in cynicism has paral-elled the 
rise in policy dissatisfaction. In most cases, the 
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relationship weakened slightly (e.g., Eta decreased from. 36 
to .27 for whit€ Democrats). Eta did increase by .03 {from 
.15 to .18) for Republicans, too small to conclude that a 
ma jor change took place. 
Monotonic relationships are also evident when comparing 
mean cynicism with distance from the Democratic Party (,rable 
4b). The total cross-section means increa;se from 2.77 !least 
distant) to 3.63 (most distant). The increase is from 2.19 
to 3.52 for Republicans and 2.59 to 4.13 for independents. 
The relationships are slightly curvilinear at the uppeTI ends 
of the distance scale for the two Democratic groups. After 
mean cynic1sm rises to 3.35 from 2.19 (least distant), it 
drops to 3.10 (most distant). The same occurs for black 
Democrats: a rise from 2.89 to 3.37, then a drop to 3.00. 
Again, this could be due to the small sample size. 
Consistent across all tables, 1970 and 1976, is the 
higher level of Repllblican tru;st overall, though cynicism 
increased for eaca group. Eta values decreased between .J:he 
two yeaIis but geR€rally remained stronger for dissatisfaction 
with Republican policy than with Democratic policy I 
suggesting a partisan determinant of cynicism. 
Data presenting tae relationship beb,ee€;ll 
dissa tisfacticn with both parties and politica 1 cynicism are 
presented for 1970 and 1976 in Tables 5a and 5il. Categories 
4 thru 6 were collapsed feom the orignal variables to 
increase the number of cases in each cell enough to make 
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~nalysis possible. Data entries in each cell are mean 
political cynicism values. As one can see, as policy 
dissatisfaction with both parties increases, cynicism also 
increases. As one moves from cell 0,0 (the top left-hand 
corner) down the diagonal to cell 4,4 Ihottom right hand 
corner, the mean cynicism values increase monotonically. The 
marginals also show the same monotonic inc.rease. column and 
r.ow entries generally increase in cynicism, although spme of 
the figures are somewhat unreliable due to the insufficient 
numher of cases in the. cells. 
The same basic relationship holds true in 1976 (Table 
5h). Here one must take some cace in e"aluating. the table 
due to the very fewcespondents who are in the "least 
distant" categories; an overall increase in dissatisfact ion 
with the policies of the two major parties took place ducing 
the intervening years. There is again a mo.notonic increase 
in cynicism as one tra ve.ls down the diagonal f rom call 1,1 to 
cell 4,4, supporting. the findings in 1970. As Miller 
(1974a:968) said: 
These data thus provide strong evidence that those 
who feel !!eith~!: party offers viable solutions to 
contemporary social pcoblems are among the most 
synical, distrustful, and alienated citizens in the 
u.s. today. [Emphasis in the original.] 
External Political Inefficacy and Policy DissatisfactiJu 
We hav.e just seen that l.ncrease:$ in policy 
40 
dissatisfaction leads to increasing political cYI,licism. Now, 
an attempt lIill be made to show that external political 
efficacy is related in a similar, t,hough less defini,te 
manner. 











monotonically s!:'aJ:ting with those second least dissatisfied 
(row 1). Those least dissatis,fied shOll' a slightly larger 
inefficacy value than the next least dissatisfied. Overall, 
hO\<leve I) , as dissatisfact ion increases, so does tihe lev;el of 
political powerlessness. 
Botti wld te a,ud black Democrats show slightly curvilineaD 
patterns, though on opposite ends of the conti nuum. The most 
dissatisfied white Democrats are slig;htly less pOlierlJ~ss tnan 
those next most dissatisfied. Por blacks, the least 
dissatisfied are sligihtly more powerless than those nex,t 
least dissatisfied. Republicans show a definite curvilineaJ: 
relationship. The seven percent liho are least dissatisfied 
li i tn the policies of their party are the fourth most 
dissatisfied. As stated before, this is very likely to have 
been caused by the perception of the Democratic Congress 
refusing to pass Republican policy. The Democratic 
gOV€J.::nment is ~ot responsive to the needs o_f the Repuhlican 
Party and t berefore to the needs of Republican Party 
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supp,arters. Fin all y ,independents show a monotonic increase 
in inefficac y as policy distance increases. 
Overall, therefore, a general relationship of increasing 
external political ineff icacy with increasing distance fro.lll 
Repu.blican policies exists. Far the most part, tilis 
relationship ilo.lds far Delllocr:atic policies, also (Tab.ie 6h). 
For the total cr:oss- section and white and hlack Democra ts, 
inefficacy is always higher for those least distance from the 
Democratic Party policies than for those who are next least 
distant. Frcm t.na t point, the cross-section and black 
Democrat samples both increase in inefficacy of policy 
cf issatisraction increases. For white Democrats, those most 
dissatisfied are a bit more efficacious hhan those next least 
dissatisfied 11.86 from 2.00). This could be due to the low 
percentage or white Democrats in that category. Republicans 
show a monotonic increase until one reaches the most distant 
category, wherE inef.ficacy drops some. Independents show a 
completely monotonic increase in ineffic·ac y 
with nobh dissatisfaction with Repub1ican and with 
Dellocra t policies, Republicans overall are the most 
externally politically efficacious. Tile associations are 
stro,nger for dissatisfaction from Republican policy than from 
Democratic Policies, however; Eta f or the cross-section is 
.21 for the formeD bub only .12 fOD the latter. Tn.e only 
variation is for 211dependents. There bhe relationship was 
stro·nger for Democratic policy dissatisfaction (.23 compared 
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to .21). The difference 1S small enough too be ignored, 
however. 
In 1976. the overall relationship remains the same. It 
is somewhat more amhiguous for Republican 
dissatisfaction, however (Table 7a,. The total cross-section 
shows curvilinearity at the least and most distant positions, 
probably due to the low number of people in those positions. 
The same occurs for whoite Democrats. Black Democrats and 
independents show decreasing inefficacy in the more distant 
, 
positions. Republicans least dissatisofied with Republican, 
policy are t,he most powerless. 
Republicans have a mean value. 73 less tlun the least distant 
(from 2.03 to 1.3D}. After that, illefficacy increases 
monotonically. In alol cases, "hen the marginal distrcibutions 
are taken into account, the relationships are basical1}' as 
predicted; external political inefficacy is positively 
related to distance from the poliCy posi tion,s of the 
Republicall Party. 
Distance from the Democratic Pal:ty (Table 7b) is much 
more consistent. The total cross-section and white and black 
Democl:ats all show de.finite monotonic relationships. Black 
Democrats show the laLgest increase between least and most 
distant, fLom 1.1111 to 2.28 Oil an .Bll increase in exteLilal 
inefficacy. white Democrats run a close second, with a .77 
increase in inefficacy_ Republicans and independents Doth 
show slight curvilinear: re 1a tionships; those least 
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dissatisfied tend to be a litt,le higher inineffica,cy than 
those next least distant. As in 1970, the Eta values are 
higher for Republica,n dissatisfaction than for Democratic. 
Unlike cynicism, however, the strength of the re,lationships 
did not really weaken very llIuch between 1970 and 1976. E,ta 
fell by only .03 between the years for both of the 
cross-sections. 
External inefficeacy and distance from both parties is 
presented in Table 8a for 1970 and Table 8b for 1976. 
Overall, as distance from bonch parties increase, so does 
inefficacy. This relationship is strongen for distance frcm 
thee Republican Party than fo,r the Democratic Party in 1970. 
each column is generally monotonic while each row In::eaks 
monotonicity. If one takes into account the small marginals 
in row and column 0 ill 1976, the sallie monotonicity in the 
columns and non-monotonicity in the rows takes place. No,t 
only those who feel that neither party offers viable 
solutions to socia,l problems polibically cynical, but they 
also tend to be externally inefficacious. 
Internal Political Inefficacy and Policy Dissatisfaction 





inefficacy are very diterent from those 
cynicism and for external political 
inef£icacy. Table 9a presents data for Republica.n Party 
policy dissatisfaction and internal inefficacy for 1970 •. All 
( 
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of the subsamples ha ve curvilinear relationships and one is 
even slig:htly negative. The total cross-section begins with 
a m.ea n inefficacy value of 1.70 for those closest to 
Republican pplicy. The value drops for those next closest, 
and continues to rise until row 4, where it drops again, only 
to rise to 2.05 for those most distant froll) the perceived 
policies of the Republican Party. The last drop in the mean 
value was quite small and could be due to sampl.ing error. 
Precisely th.e salle basic relationship exists for white 
Democrats. Stallting with an intial high value, inefficacy 
drops, the.n rises, then drops, and finally rises again. The 
overallrelat,icnship is positive but not very Linear (r = 
.(6). For blaCK Democrats, the eelationship is again 
curvilinear, but geneeally positive in the direction 
hypothesized. Republicans begin with a llonot.onic 
relationship. !hosefourtJ> most distant trow 3) were lower 
in inefficacy than all other Republicans, however. The 
relationship for independents is actually slightly "§l.S!.at.i.lU@,! 
as distance inceease, inefficacy decreases (r = -.(1). The 
ee lationshi p is too curvi lineae t·o suggest reasons for this 
ph enOlllenon. 
Democra tic policy dissatisfaction is generally slightly 
!!§.gia!~.l1§.l.Y related to internal polibical inefficacy {Tahle 
9 hi • The moderate Eta values reflect the curvilinear nature 
of the reltionships. suhstituting PearsOll's e foe Eta, we 
find r equals -.05, -.04, -.04, -.02, and .04. These values 
are much .lower and suggest that in 1970, policy dIstance feom 
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the Delllocra tic Party is basically unrelated to internal 
political ine!'ficacy. Thus we see that internal political 
inefficacy is related positively, though slightly 
inconsistently, to Republican Party policy dissatisfactio.n 
but unrelated to distance from the Delllocratic Party position. 
Evaluation of data from 1976 show the same results. In 
table 10a, one sees curvilinea r but po51 ti ve relationshi 1'5. 
The most linear relationships are found for white Democrats 
and Republicans (r =. i 1 and • 12, respectively). The most 
curvilinear is the associa tion between bLack Democrats and 
distance (Eta = .17 while r only equals .(9). 
Analyzing distance from Democratic policy {Table 1i}b}, 
we see again that there is very little evidence o:f any linear 
relationship, except in the case of independents (if the 
marginal distributions are taken into account). The B-ta 
values for the t;otal cross-section and for the two Democratic 
subgroups are low; none is larger than .10. Only the Eta for 
independents reallyceaches any level of respectabili,ty_ 
Pearson's r tceadi.ng from left to right) are only -. (}', .03, 
-.001, -.OB, and .12. Overall, therefore, the data suggest 
t hat internal politica 1 inefficacy is rela ted to 
dissatisfaction with Repub.lican Pacty posi·tions on issues and 
unrelated to distance from the percieved position fl:Olll the 
Democratic Party~s positions. 
As beforE, we now examine the relationship between 
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internal political inefficacy and distance from both parties. 
In 1970 (Table 11a), there is a curvilinear relationship 
3.10ng the diagonal; those least dissatsfie.d and those most 
dissatis.iied are the most poweDless. people in the middle 
had higher levels of efficacy. Again, every column shows a 
general increase in inefficacy as distance i·nc reases. But no 
consistent relationship is foun,d in any of the rows. 
r nternal inefficacy is completely det.ermined by distanc.e from 
the Republican pc.licy position. Dat.a for 1976 is presented 
in Table 11 b. There is no relationship between policy 
dissatisfaction from both parties and internal inefficacy; 
th<a in<afficacy values fail to rise as 000 moves dow.n the 
diagonal. There is a slight tendency in some columns for 
inefficacy to rise as distance from t,he Republican Party 
increases, however. iilha t lit tIe inc.rease in internal 
po1ictical inefficacy .is due to policy dissatisfaction is from 
policy dissatisfaction from the Republican Party only. 
summary on the Effects of Policy Dissatisfaction 
In summa ry I we ,have seen that po1iticai cyn,icislli and 
external political i'nefficacy are related to feelings that 
government outputs are not satisfactory I at 1e ast as measured 
by policy dissatisfaction with the two major political 
parties. Internal political inefficacy is almost unrelated 
to the distance of tnerespondent's policy positio.n froll! tke 
percei ved poli tical parties' positions. A ne:=essary question 
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to answer is how are we to explain the relationship hetweep 
cynicism and external inefficacy, with policy iissatisfaction. 
A party identification based interpretation is untenable; it 
would require a zero correlat.ion between cynicism and 
distance from Democra tic policies for Democrats and a zero 
correlation behleen Republican policies a nd Republicans, a 
posLtion unsunstained in OUi: a,nalysis (see l'liller. 1974a) • 
All party identification groups l>ended to increase in these 
tliO dimensions of political alienation. 
Individuals with extreme opi.p.ions may be more cynical 
because of a disjunction between the preceived and actual 
values and norms of society. These e,xtre,mists may confuse 
ignm;ance of political norms wihlI the oonviction that no 
norms exist (McClOSKY and Schaar, 1965: 33) • 
Miller (1974a) proposes and Citrin (1974) confirms that 
the relationships between cynicism and policy dissatisfactio)l 
can be explained hy relative left-right ori,entations o'f 
people. "Cynics of the left" are those people who perce,ive 
the two parties as being too fa r to the rig ht. .. Cy nics of 
thp right" are those who see the parties as heing too 
"lef tist;" thei r distrust of the governlllent st.ellls from ,t he 
belief that gcv€rnlllent administration is too liberal. people 
who were least distant from party positions did not seethe 
parties as be.ing too liberal or conser-vati ve and thus were 
not as cynical. This would be consistent no matter where the 
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respondent places hi!l!self on the liberal-conservative scale 
since distance is a .relative measure an.d does not take into 
account the actual point of depar,ture on the issue scales. 
This left-right distinction implies that increases in 
cynicism and 6.xternal inefficacy Was tile result of a 
combination of "unfullfilled expectations, and for others, 
the perception oitheir s:ituation, "h:icb: was already one o·f 
deprivation and disCrimination, had actually worsened 
relative to that of others" {l'liller,1974a:9691. But these 
feel.ings of relat:ive deprivation and dissa;tisfact ion lllay be 
due to other faotoL"s, too, factors such aseducatioual level 
or income. House and Mason (1975) llIainta:in that soc:ia.l 
location variables are relatively unimportant aud thai: 
dissatisfaction with policy and its eifecL on cynicism are 
distributed aoross traditional demogL"aphic d:ivisions. We 
still must compare social location variables with policy 
dissatisfacticn in order to evalua te interactions between tile 
two sets of variables and to determine which variahl..es are 
more important in pred:icting political alienation. 
THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL LOCATION VARIABLES AND 
POLICY DISSA TI SFACTION 
The interaction of social. location variabl.es and policy 
dissatisfaction was exalllin.ed by regressing education, income, 
race, sex, and the two measures of policy distancefroffi the 
two rna jor parties on the three measures oi political 
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alienation. Var:iables i Ii the equation had the follmdng 
oategories: 
Distanoe from the Republican Party and Distanoe 
fr:Olll the Democr:atio Party 
o = least distant to 6 = most distaut 
Edncation[ 24] 1 = eighth gr:ade or less 




3 = high school graduate 
1+ = some college 
5 = college gradua te or mor:e 
1 = loY! income 
2 = medium 1011 income 
3 =' medium inoome 
4 = medium high inoome 
5 = high income 
0 = male 
1 = female 
() =' white 
1 = all other raoes 
Results for political cynicism for: the years 1970, 1972, 
1974, ana 1976 ar:e preseated in table 12a. Distance fr:om the 
peroeived policy position of the Republican Pa.r:t y is 
consistently the most powerful predictor: of political 
cynicism judging by its beta lIeight[25]. As dista.nc:e 
increases, so does cynicism. Education and distance from the 
(24 ]It is recognized that education and income are only 
ordinal level and thus violate some of the assumptions 
inlLerent in multiple r:e gr:essi on. The number: of categor:ies 
each has and their fairly nOl::mal distr:ibution allow their: 
tr:eatment as interval level, as long as it is remembered that 
they are only rough estimates. 
[25 ]Beta is the standar:dized r:egression coeffiecent and 
determines the relative st!:ength of each of the variables in 
the regression equation aite!: par::tialing out the effects of 
all the other variables in the equation. The higher: the 
absolute valu.e o£ beta, the higher it.s predictive power giv-en 
that set of variables. The sign of beta dete!:mines whether: 
: - the variable is positively or: negatively corr:elated with the 
dependent vdr:iable. 
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Democra tic Party are the next most infl uen tial variables. As 
we saw in an earLier discussion of policy dissatisfiaction, 
d.istance from the Democratic party is less important; than 
distance from the Repub.lican. Education is negatively 
correla ted; as education increases, cynicism decl:eases. 
Income, sex, and race have little or no influence au 
cynicism( 26]. The variance explai;ned runs between eight and 
15 percent. 
Education is by far the best predic tor: of internal 
inefficacy {Table 12b). No other variable comes close to its 
predictive power. Income and to some extent l:ace also have 
predicitive power,. but the policy dissatisfaction measures 
show v;el1Y little influence. Internal political inefficacy 
seems to .be mainly determined by social location val:iables 
and within those, by education. Seventeen to twenty-one 
percent of the variance lias explained by the equations, most 
of it by education. 
Education again has the greatest influence When 
examining external political inefficacy (Table 12c), followed 
oy the two policy dissatisi'action varia"'les. Sex ;has n.o 
influence and neither does race (except ilt 1974) or income 
(except in 1970). The dete.cminants of external inefficacy 
[ 26 ]The relati v-€ unimporta nee 
pa rellels finding by Agger 
educational attainment much 
if income was controlled. 
o£ income campared to. education 
§.t. ~l.. {1961} • They found 
more important than income even 
( 
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seem to be somewhere between those of internal inefficacy and 
cynicism, thosE tending toward the policy dissatifaction 
orientation of political cynicism. 
Summary 
Overall, therefore, education is the most consistent 
pred.ictor of polit.ical alienation. This ~s especially 
impo:ctant when one :cealizes that the ave:cage leve.l of 
edncation in the United States has increased and ~ 
continuing to increase. policy dissatisfaction is most 
impprtant for understanding political cynicism, not impartank 
at aU. in explaining internal political inefficacy, and 
somewhat important in predicting external political 
ineffic·acy. 'Irustin the government is most dependent on 
pnblic satisfaction of policy outpnts and then by education, 
perhaps because higher education allows the citizen to 
u.ude:cstand exactly what is inVOlved in makling policy oU'tpucts. 
Cognitive ability determines how powerful! and polit:i:cally 
effective one feels. A nd a comb ina tion of ed ncation and 
poli.cy satisfaction predicts whether the citizen sees the 
government as lJesponsive to his o.r her demands and needs. 
Race, contrary to the import given it in past studies, is not 
a stllong predictor of political alienation. 
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SUMMARY AND DISCDSSION 
The results show that different dimensipns of political 
alienation, are interrelated with different social location 
and policy dissatisfaction variables im different ways. 
political cynicism is 
d.issatisfcation variables and 




dissatisfaction has no inf luence on inte rnal political 
inefficacy. 
the middle; 
ExternaL political inefficacy falls somewhere in 
it seems to be affected by bott. dissatifaction 
and the individual's place ill. the social structure. 
At the bivariate level education was related to aLl 
three measures of political alienatifon, but much more hig111y 
for the hwo efficacy scales than for cynicism. Income was 
similarily associated t a.lthough at a slighhly weaker level. 
Blacks weee consistently less efficacious than whites on both 
scales. The relationship between race and cynicism reverses 
in the late sixties, with b.lacks becoming more cynical. 
Overall, the e.elationsjlips between eace and polit1cal 
alienation were never as high as one reading the literature 
might expect. Still, dissatisfaction with government policy 
has made blacks cne of the most cYnical groups in socie,ty. 
Females weee less personally politically powerful but sex 
( 
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could not predict levels of cynicism or external political 
inefficacy. Subjective social class, like education and 
income, was consistently related t,o the three scales, tho ugh 
more for the efficacy measures than for cynicism. 
Thus the social. location o,f an individu3.1 is related to 
levels of internal inefficacy, external inefficacy I and 
cynicism. with the exception of race, the strengths of the 
associations remain relatively constant over the yeacs. 
Because rising cynicism cuts across all demographic groups, 
the ,analysis of social location lea ves us in the dark as to 
why it rose. The answer was found in dissatisfact,ion witli 
gove:Lnment policy, operationalized as distance between til" 
respondent and his perceptions of the policy positions 0:£ the 
Republican and Democratic Parties. Both in 1970 and 1976, 
political cynicism lias associa ted with policy 
dissatisfaction. The higher the d,issatisfaction, the nigher 
the cynicism, even across race and party identification 
lines. More importalltly I it was shown that dissatisfaction 
increased between 1970 and 1976, suggesting that the changing 
lev~el of cynicism is a function of policy jissatisfaction. 
Therela l;ionship was consistently stronger for distance frO~lll 
the perceived posil;ion of t~he Republican Party than for the 
Democratic Party I perhaps because of the problems the 
Republican Party bad getting policies passed through the 
Democl:atic- held Congress, or heca use of Republican follies 
like Wa terga te. External ineffica;cy vas relal;ed in a similaIi 
fashion although not 
existed betw€en internal 
dissatisfaction. how€ver. 





Given that the predictive power of the two groups of 
variables depended on the measure of political alienation 
used, the inteRaction between social location and policy 
dissatisfact ion wer€ next examined. Policy dissatisfaction 
played the na jar role in predicting polica'l cynici sm, 
followed by education. Race, sex, andin:::ome were of little 
value. Educatiun was by far the major predictor of internal 
political inefficacy. None of the other variables came close 
to explaining as much of the variance and pOlicy 
dissatisfactic.n fail€d to provide any significant predictive 
power. The most variance in external inefficacy was 
explained by education also, but policy dissatisfaction was 
the second major predictor. Thus education was the most 
significant predictor overall, although policy 
dissatisfaction was more important in explaining cynicism and 
influential in predicting external inefficacy. 
The impprtance of education on political alLenation 
cannot be minimized. It has been shawn that higher education 
levels are related to lower levels of political alienation. 
Because the average level of education in the United States 
has b-een. rising" the ef_fect h.as been to coun.teract -the rising 
level of cynicism. If the average educational level had not 
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risen, we would be seeing much highe.r levels of cynicism 
today. 
Rising education has made the public more tolerant of 
the government. But still, cynicism has risen. This is 
because a s€cond ma jor force, policy d issa tisfaction, has 
been cutting across demographic divisions. Parties are no 
longer able to satis.fy the demands of their constituents and 
people find little confidence in their ability to respond to 
their needs. As Miller (1974a: 971) points out, this great 
dissatisfaction with the policies of both the RepubLican and 
Democratic parties impLies "that conditions are highly 
conducive to party reaLignment and reformation or a third 
party movement"( 28 J Trust cannot cOntinu,e to erode. Som.e 
sort of reformation must take place. perhaps P'resideni't 
Carter's attempts to bring government closer to the people 
will su=eed in placating people. This is unli.kely unless he 
can bring a new unity to issues: charismatic leadership may 
ca use a temporarY17eduction in cynicism, but does not solve 
the Underlying problems. perhaps the best policies to be 
follolled by the government would attempt to r:elieve feelings 
of relative dep.17ivation, not only among th\e poor:, but also 
lIithin the working and middle classes. 
A second major concern is the effect rising educational 
opportunities will have on aggregate levels of efficacy. No 
[28]Although ladd and Hadley t1975) argue that some party 
re.aligumen t has already occured. 
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really significant changes have taken place in levels of 
internal or external efficacy, perhaps because of Hie 
counter-tendencies of policy dissatisfaction. But if policy 
dissatisfaction decreases or the average level of education 
increases greatly. there liil1 be more people who feel t!tey 
have the ability to influence the government and who feel 
that the governmen.t is responsive. The implications are 
important; increasing perceptions of power, coupled witjh high 
levels ,of cynicism may create a tense political climate and 
an increase in the nnmber of demands on the .government. 
wihh the ever increasing levels of cynicism, why has the 
U nitied Sta tes not succumbed to viole nt anti -government 
movements? Cynicism is high and policy dissatisfactio'n has 
been growing. several reasons may be suggested. First, 
neit.her internal nor external ineff.icacy has s no lin a 
significant increase in the past guarber century. People 
generally still feel they have some control over the 
government and that the government is to so me extent still 
re sponsi ve. The poli.tical system is not bad, at least yet. 
The cynLcisll! seems more directed toward government. officials. 
People may he alienated froll! those whio occupy official 
positions in the political systell! and their policy outputs 
ra ther than frem the political system itself. They still 
re tain their national poli.tical identity of being "American." 
As Easton (1965) argued, distrust is first directed at the 
a uthorities, then to the political system. and finally to the 
political community. The constant level of efficacy has 
57 
prevented cynicism from extending past the first level. If 
the increase in cynicism continues, the pU,blic may eventually 













Table 1. Coefficients of Reproducibility and 













































Tabl.e 2. 1'Jea,n values of Political cynicism, Internal 
Poli tical Inef flcac}" and External political 
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------------------------------------------------------------*The cynicism scale ranges froll! 0 = low cynicism to 5 = high 
cynicism. 
**The lHW inefficacy scales ranges froll! () = low inefficacy to 
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Figure 1. Mean Political Cynicism by 
Sex, 1958 to 1976 
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Figure 2. Mean External Political Inefficacy by 































Figure 3. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by 
Sex, 1952 to 1976 
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Figure 4. Mean Political Cynicism by 
Race, 1958 to 1976 
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Figure 5. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by 
Race, 1952 to 1976 
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Figure 6. Mean External Political Inefficacy by 
Race, 1968 to 1976 
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Figure 7. Mean Political Cynicism by 
Educational Level, 1958 to 1976 
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Figure 8. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by 
Educational Level, 1952 to 1976 
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Figure 9. Mean External Political Inefficacy by 
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Figure 10. Mean Political Cynicism by 
Income, 1958 to 1976 
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Figure 11. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by 
Family Income. 1952 to 1976 
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Figure 12. Mean External Political Inefficacy by 
Family Income, 1968 to 1976 
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Figure 13. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by 
Subjective Social Class, 1952 to 1976 
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Figure 14. Mean External Political Inefficacy by 
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Figure 15. Mean Political Cynicism by 
Subjective Social Class, 1958 to 1976 
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__ li:'!.h~y. __ l1~!!Q~_~ ____ k1~~!L __ ~ ____ tlgi!!! ___ iL ___ !igi!!! ___ ?L ___ !ig!!!L_L __ _ 
0 1.77 3.9 1.09 2.3 1.33 3.1 2.00 6.9 2.08 3.3 
1 1.85 28.2 1.66 20.1 1.55 18.9 1.93 47.6 1.91 26.4 
2 2.37 36.2 2.40 37.3 2.32 35.5 2.31 34.6 2.40 39.4 
3 2.85 21.1 2.84 25.7 2.97 24.0 2.44 8.6 2.89 23.1 
4 3.26 7.8 3.23 11 .3 3.39 12.7 2.40 1.7 3.36 5.9 
5 3.43 2.3 3.42 2.4 3.48 4.6 ** 3.67 1.5 
6 4.21 5.4 ** 4.00 1.2 ** ** 
Group Mean 
and Total 
Percent 2.40 104.9 2.47 99.1 2.51 100.0 2.12 99 .. ·4 2.45 9.6 
{N) {1472; (573) (417) (361 ) (454) 
Eta .31 .36 .42 .15 .29 
*Cell-entEieS-are-mean-cy:iilcls;-;a:lnes-:--The-cynICIsi-scale-r:anges--fr:om 
o = least cynical to 5=most cynical. 









_Rf!£iL ___ [~£~1l! ____ !i~i!!!. ___ ! ____ t'l~£ll ___ ! ____ t!.~£!l. ___ ~ ____ [~£!! ___ l'£ ___ _ 
0 2.38 2.2 2.55 1.2 ** 2.28 4.3 2.43 2.2 
1 2.49 3 1 • 4 2.54 20.7 2.52 19.9 2.36 52.2 2.63 30.7 
2 3.07 38.4 3.C5 37.3 3.14 34.6 2.71 34.8 3.27 44.3 
3 3.37 20.! 3.28 28.5 3.25 28.6 3.34 7.9 3.48 19.2 
4 3.69 5.6 3.83 8.8 3.45 11.1 ** 4.13 2.4 
5 4.06 1.8 3.81 3.2 3.92 3. i ** 4.50 1.2 
r 
** ** 3.76 2.2 ** ** " 
G :coup Mean 
and Total 
Pe£cent 2.99 99.5 3.10 100.2 3. 12 99.5 2.56 99.2 3.14 100.0 
!Hl (1440) {502} t4l3) (368) (499) 
Eta .21 .27 .23 .18 .27 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
*Cell entries are ll\€an cyn,icism values. The cynicism scale £ang€sf£om 
o = least cynical to 5=most cynical. 









__ ~f!.£ty __ 1IegJl!_~ __ -11~9JL __ ~ ____ ~~f!.!L __ ~ ____ [§.f!.!L __ ! ____ \i2f!.l.L_ % ___ _ 
0 2. 11 7.8 2.15 11.2 2.01 13.7 2 .• 00 2.1 2.00 4.2 
1 2.15 32.9 2.26 44.0 2.29 40.8 1.72 16.4 1 • 96 29.2 
2 2.44 35.3 2.63 33.2 2.71 33.5 1.94 39.9 2.47 37.1 
3 2.71 11.4 3.02 9.6 3.09 10.6 2.25 27.3 2.91 21. 7 
4 3.06 4.7 3.71 1 .4 ** 2.64 8.8 3.33 6.5 
5 3.15 1.6 ** ** 2.92 4 .. 7 3 .• 67 1.1 6 ** ** ** ** ** 
Group !'lean 
and Total 
Per:cent 2.41 99.7 2.47 99.4 2.51 99.2 2.09 99.2 2.47 99.8 
Oil (1456) (582) (424) (341 ) {448} 
Eta .17 .21 .25 .21 .28 
------------------------------------------------------------------*Cell entries are mean cynicism va.lues. The cynicism· scale ranges fEom 
o = least cynical to 5=most cynical. 









__ K.;l!:.tY ___ l1!'l!!!!=--L ___ tl!'l!!lL __ I2 ____ 1'1!'l!!!! ___ i'! ____ 11!'l:!& ___ :& ____ 11!'l!!!! ___ 1L __ _ 
0 2.77 2.3 2.19 2.2 2.89 4.4 ** 2.59 2.2 
1 2.90 31.5 3 .. 08 43.5 3.09 40.5 2.19 14.2 2.82 30.7 
2 2.97 41.9 3.14 39.9 3.17 39.8 2.38 42.2 3.12 45.11 
3 3.12 17.4 3.35 12.6 3.37 12.9 2.67 30.3 3.56 1!! .3 
1+ 3.27 5.4 3.10 2.0 3.00 2.2 3.03 10.6 3.64 5.8 
5 3.63 1.5 ** ** 3.52 3.3 4.13 1.6 
(; ** ** ** ** ** 
Group M-ean 
and Total 
Percent 2.99 1()O.O 3.11 100.2 3. 14 99.8 2.54 100.6 3.13 100.0 
(1'1) {1433} {1I99} ~!! 10) poD) {502} 
Eta .09 .13 .10 .19 .20 
------------------~--------------------------,----------------------
*Cell entries are mean cynicism values. The cynicism scale Langes from 
o = least cynical to 5=most cynical. 
**1'1 was less than 5 O,L less than one percent of the total. 
Table 5a. !'lean p'olitical cynicism by Distance 
:from Both Parties, 1970 
Dis ta nee f rom J2bst.a!!£~Lf!:'QlLJ2~~Q££!l!b£_1:§.£!Y 
Republican 
1:~£!Y __________ O ________ l _________ £ ________ l _________ ~ _______ £Qi!ll 
0 2.25* 2.00 2.,,57 2.00 3.67 2.39 
(1.7%) (o.!!) (o. 6) (0. 1) {O.31 (3. 1) 
1 1.81 2.28 2.30 2.74 2.00 2.32 
( 1. 4) (10.6) (7.0) , {3 .8l {1.0} (23.7) 
2 2.69 2.58 2.65 2.90 3 .. 22 2.70 
( 1 • 4) i1 0.01 (16.5) {5.9) (1.6) (35.4) 
3 2.56 2.99 3.10 3.10 3.25 3.05 
(1. 4) (6.6) (7.9) (5.9) (2.1) (23.8) 
4 3.50 3.21 3.65 3.79 4.39 3.58 
(2. 1) (4.5) (4.2) 11 .7) {1 • 6) (14.1). 
Total 2.63 2.65 2.79 3.02 3.35 2.81 
{B.O)!;} {32.1; (36.2) (17 .2) (6.4) ( 100.0%) 
Eta = .027 N=1145 
-----------------------------------------------------------.------
*Cell entries ar.e mean cynicism values. The cynicism scale ranged 
from 0 = least cynical to 5 = most cynical. Tne numbers in 
par:enthesis are the pere.entage o:f cases in each cell. 
Table 5b. Mean Political cynicism by Distance 
from Both par:ties, 1976 
Distanc€ fro III !!.!§ta'!!Q~Lf£Q.llLQ.gg[Q£.£~J:;.b.Q_~~hl;.y 
Republican 
~££iy _________ ~ ____ ~ ____ 1_________ ~ ________ J _________ ! _______ ~Q.J:;.£1 
0 3.38* 2.40 3.47 4.00 3.25 3.23 
(0.3% } (O.4) (0.7) ,0.2) (0.3) (1.8) 
1 4.00 2.78 2.82 2.94 2.97 2.85 
(0.1I) (11 • OJ nO.3) (5.5) (2.5) (29.6) 
'} 11.00 3.17 3.24 3.21 3.37 3.23 ~ 
(0.2) pO.l) (19.7) to•5) (2.8) (39.4) 
3, 1.00 3.36 3.39 3.74 4.26 3.50 
{O.2} {6.4} (8.11) (4.8) p.2) pO.9) 
4 4.23 3.52 4.27 3.83 4.50 3.92 
(0.8 ) (3.5) (2.8) (O.9) (0.4) (8.4) 
Total 3.81 3 .. 10 3.24 3.31 3.44 3.23 
(1.8%). (31.3) (41.9) (17 .8) (7. 1) {1QO.O;q 
Eta = .012 N=1302 
-----------------------------------------------------------,------
*Cell entnies aE.€ m€an cynicism values. The cynicism scale ranged 
from () = least cynical to 5=most cynical. Tn€ number", in 




Table 6a. ~lean External Inefficacy by Distance 





__ P.i!.£t:L __ tl.l2i!!l.! __ ~ ____ :tl.l2£!L __ ~ ____ !1!ti!.L __ 1L __ Mei!.!l. __ ~ ____ /i§.i!.L __ L __ _ 
0 1.38 3.9 .91 2.3 1. 33 3. 1 1.62 6.9 1.12 3.3 
1 1.26 28.2 1. 23 20.1 1.07 19.0 1.27 47.6 1.22 26.1+ 
2 1.52 36.1 1. 56 37.4 1.59 35.6 1. 39 34.3 1.53 39.3 
3 1.81 21.2 1.84 25.5 2 .. 07 24.0 1.57 8.9 1.69 23.5 
4 1.98 7.7 1.94 11. 4 2.01 12.7 2.90 1.7 1.16 5.9 
5 2.20 2.3 1.63 2.4 2.12 4.6 ** 2.67 1.5 
6 ** ** 2.33 1.2 ** ** Group Mean 
aud Total 
Percent 1.56 99.4 1.60 99.1 1.68 100.2 1.40 99.4 1. 51 99.9 
(N) (1471) (572) (416) (J61) (455) 
Eta .21 .21 .31 .21 .21 
*cell--enbiTes--are-niean:--externai--iiiefficacY--values-:----The--exberii3:1 
inefficacy scale ranges froll! () = least inefficacious t:> 3 = IlW3t 
i.nefficacious. 




TallIe 6ll. lIean External Inefficacy by Distance 





__ E.f!.£.ty ___ Mei!ll*_J ___ IIgi!!!. ___ ~ ____ li~!!!L __ ~ ____ !1gi!!!. ___ lL ___ tl.gi!!L __ L __ _ 
() i.78 2.2 1.64 1.2 ** 2.03 4.3 1.48 2.2 
1 1.47 31.4 1.41 20.6 1.41 19.9 1 .30 52.0 1.73 3.08 
2 1.83 38.6 1.91 38.1 1.91 34.9 1.75 34.9 1.82 44.5 
3 1.97 19. 8 1.83 28.3 2.03 28.1 1. 84 7.8 2 .. 15 1. 91 
4 2.14 5.5 2.19 8.6 2.16 11.1 ** 2.22 2.4 
5 1.92 1.8 2.13 3.2 2.08 3.1 ** 1.58 1.2 
6 ** ** 1. 59 2.2 ** ** 
Group Mean 
and Total 
Percent 1.76 99.3 1.81 100.0 1.87 99.3 1.54 99.0 1.86 100.2 
{NJ ( 1446) t499) { 41.3~ (373) (503) 
Eta .19 .21 .22 ~23 .15 
*Cell--entrles--are---;ean--external--inefflcacy--values:---The--external 
i,ne,fficacy scale ranges from 0 = least ineff,icacious to 3 = most 
inefficacious. 
**1{ wa s less hhan 5 or less tha none percen t of, the total. 







from Democratic Party, 1970 • 
White Black 
__ ;e~!:iY __ 1i!igJ!:!: __ L __ tl!ig.lL __ ~ ____ Me~!l. ___ lL ___ tl.!iil!L __ lL ___ tl§!.i!.!L __ l! ___ _ 
0 1.64 7.8 1.63 11.2 1.83 13.7 1 I> 00 2.1 1. 29 4.2 
1 1.44 32.7 1. 47 44.0 1.49 40.8 1.2.5 16.1} 1. 29 29.2 
2 1..51 35.6 1.60 33.3 1.71 33.7 1.28 40.5 1. .51 37. (} 
3 1.6.5 17.4 2.00 9.5 2.18 10.4 1.38 26.7 1.63 22.3 
4 2.02 4.6 1.86 1.3 ** 1.88 8_.8 2.21 6.5 
5 2.03 1.6 ** ** 1. 62 4,,7 3.00 1.1 
6 ** ** ** ** ** 
Group Mean 
and Total 
PeJ:cent 1. 56 99.7 1.59 99.3 1.69 98.6 1.37 99.2 1.52 100.3 
(211 ( 1456) {.582} 1424l (341) (£i 49) 
Eta .12 .13 • 18 .16 .23 
*c;jj:--;ntiie~--~re -mean--externai--inefficacy--values:---ihe--externi 1 
inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = l.east ineff icacious t:> 3 = m;nt 
i;nefficacious. 




Table 7h. Hean External Inefficacy by Distance 








__ £.i!.£H ___ [i~£!'l!:: __ lL __ M~i!!L __ ~ ____ !:!.~9JL __ ~ ____ Mei!l! ___ li ____ tt~~!L __ L __ _ 
0 1. 57 2.4 1.58 2.4 1.44 4-.9 ** 1.86 2.2 
1 1.6.8 31.6 1.58 42.9 1.77 39.8 1.55 1!L5 1.75 31.2 
2 1.76 41.9 1.91 40.0 1.88 40.3 1.48 41.8 1.81 45.3 
3 1.89 17.5 2.21 12.7 2.25 12.9 1. 46 30.1 2.24 14.2 
4 1.94 5.4 2.35 2.0 2.28 2.2 1.65 10.7 2.19 5.7 
5 2.27 1.5 ** ** 2.35 3.3 2.19 1.6 
6 ** ** ** ** ** 
Gr:oup Mean 
and Total 
Percent 1.77 100.3 1.81 100.0 1.87 100.1 1.53 100.4 1. 88 100.2 
(N) (1443) (497) (412) (366) (506) 
Eta .09 .20 .17 .14 .16 
*Cell--~nt~Ie~--are--mean--exte~nal--Inefficacy--values:---ihe--external 
inefficacy sca.le ranges frOID 0 = least inefficacious t::> 3 = ID::>5t 
inefficacious. 
**N was less than 5 or: less than one percent of the total. 
T.anle 8a. Mean Exterrral Political Inefficacy by Distance 
from Both Parties, 1970 
Dis tance from D i§i'!!!£!!Lf£2.!L!l.~!l!Q££~ti~l~£iY 
Republican 
l'g.tY ____ ~ ___ Q. _________ l _________ ~ _______ L ________ L ______ Tot~! 
\} 2.29* 2.00 1. 71 2.00 3.00 2.19 
p.8%) (0.4) (G.7) (0.1) (0.3) p.4) 
1 2.31 2.14 1. 89 1.97 2.29 2.05 
( 1. 4) (9.7) {,6.9) (3.6) (0.7) (22.3) 
2 2.31 2.01 2.15 2. 19 2.80 2. 15 
(1. 7) pO.l) (16.0) (5.5) (1.6) (34.8) 
3 2.27 2.35 2.46 2.33 2.33 2 • .37 
(1.61 (6.7) (7.5) (6.0) (2.2) {24. 0) 
4 2.76 2.40 2.33 2.56 2.47 2.46 
(2.2) (4.8) (4.6) (1 .9) {2.3) (15.4) 
Total 2.41 2.18 2.18 2.23 2.51 2.23 
(8.7%) (31.6) (35.7) t 17 .1) (6.9) ( 1(1). 0%) 
Eta = .027 N=945 
*ceII--entrIes--ar:e--iiieaii--eitecnal-inefficacy-valaes:---The-efficacy 
scale ranged .from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most imefficacious. 
Th.e nUlilbers in parenth.esis are the percentage of cases in eac!). cell. 
Table 8b. Mean External Political Inefficacy by Distance 
from Both Parties, 1976 
Dista,nce .from l!i§!&1!£!Lf£'QllLl2§'!!!Q£.l;:"!.ib'Li'."!.£.iY 
Republican 
R.~£.ty_':" ________ Q _________ l _________ ~ ________ L _______ !L ______ 12.t.!!! 
o 1.75* 2.33 2.18 2.43 2.25 2.19 
(O.4:;;} (0.5) (0.8) (0.4) (0.4) (2.3) 
1 2.00 1.98 2.04 1.90 2.27 2.01 
(0.5) (10.7) (9.9) (4 .9) (2.5 ) {28.4) 
2 2.33 2.14 2.20 2.14 2.40 2.19 
(0.4) pO.O) (20 • .3) (6.7) (2.8) ( 40. 2) 
3 3.00 2.41 2.30 2.53 2.63 2.41 
(0.2) (5.1) (8.4) (5.4) (1. 2) (20.2l 
2.11 2.35 2.15 2.46 2.50 2.28 
(0.9) (3.5) (3.2) (1. 1) (0.4) (9.0) 
Total 2.12 2.16 2.18 2.21 2.39 2.19 
(2.3%) (29.8) (42.4) (18.4) (7.2) (100. Of>) 
Eta = .012 N=1136 
*celi--e'IitDies--aD€--mean--extecnii-efficicy-valuEiS:---'TiXe-IneffIcac'l 
sea 113 ranged from 0 = least .inefficacious to 3 = most illefficacious. 




Table 930. Mean Inte.;cnal Inefficacy by Distance 





__ ~~£~y ____ [§~~!_~ ____ Me~~ ___ ~ ____ [~~n ___ ~ ____ ~~~n ___ ! ____ ~~~~ ___ ~ ___ _ 
0 1. 70 4.0 1.77 2.3 1.90 3. 1 1.1l 1 7.0 1.85 3.5 
1 1.49 28.2 1.61 19.9 1. 52 18.8 1.45 47.7 1.41 26.3 
2 1.54 36.2 1.56 37.8 1.58 36.0 1.50 34.4 1. 51 39.1 
3 1.69 21.1 1.82 25.5 1.84 23.8 1.39 8.7 1. 57 23.3 
4 1.65 7.7 1.59 11.3 1.78 12.6 3_.00 1.6 1.31 5.9 
5 2.05 
2 __ 3 
1. 88 2.4 2.26 4.5 ** 1. 67 1.5 
6 ** ** 2.22 1.2 ** ** 
Group Mean 
and Total 
Percent 1. 59 99.5 1.66 99.2 1.70 100.0 1. 49 99.4 1.50 99.3 
(N) (1490) (577) (420) (369) (!j6G) 
Eta .11 .13 .19 .20 .11 
*cell--eRtries--are-mean-Iniernal--inefficacy--valiies-:----Tj;:e--internal 
inefficacy scale J:allges from 0 = least i ne.ff icacious to 3 = most 
ineff icacious. 
**li lH S less than 5 or less than one percent of the total. 
Tahle 9h. Mea n Internal I nefficac y by Di.stance 
from Republican Party, 1976 
l'otal 
Distance Cross- 1I.b.i. te Black 
froll! :2.<sQ1;!Q!! QglllQ££s!'!§ ll~!J!Q£!:;a!§ il.€l.12!!f!.!!.£@§. I.!!;!~2.en;!~!!:t.:? 
Republican 
__ Par!.! ____ !i!ll!!! __ lL ___ Me!1L __ ~ ____ !i!i.a!L __ 1L ___ !i!i.@ ___ 1L ___ tl.!i.a!l. __ 1L __ _ 
0 . 1.33 2.2 1. 27 1.2 ** 1.41 4 .. 3 1. 24 2.2 
1 1.32 31.3 1.% 20.6 1.41 19.7 1. 30 52.0 1.32 30.4 
2 1.58 38.8 1.64 38.2 1.73 35.0 1.43 35.2 1.59 44.9 
3 1.69 19.9 1.57 28.3 1.65 28.5 1. 91 7.7 1.79 19.0 
4 1.77 5.5 1.70 8.7 2.01 11.0 ** 1.35 2.4 
5 1.50 1.8 1.97 3.2 1.72 3.1 ** .67 1 .2 
6 ** ** 1.47 2.2 ** ** 
Gr:oup Nean 
a.nd Total 
Percent 1. 52 99.5 1.58 100.2 1.67 99.5 1.40 9.9.2 1. 52 100.1 
(N) t1458) (505) (417) (375) (506) 
Eta .15 .14 .17 .15 .19 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
*Cell entries are mean 




inefficacy values. The inter:.nal 
= least inefficacious to 3 = most 




Table 10a. !'Jean Internal Inefficacy .by Distance 






__ e££ty ____ ~~£rr~_! ____ Me£~ __ ~ ____ ~~~ll ___ ! ____ [eall ___ ~ ____ ~~£ll ___ ~ ___ _ 
D 2.01 7.9 2.03 11.1 2.02 13.6 1. 57 2.3 1.91 4.4 
1 1.55 32.7 1.57 44.2 1.67 41.2 1.48 16.0 1.43 28.9 
2 1.58 35.3 1.64 33.1 1.64 33.5 1.56 39.8 1.49 37.2 
3 1.48 17.4 1.77 9.4 1.85 1D.) 1.30 27.2 1.44 22.0 
4 1.65 4.7 1.71 1.4 ** 1.57 8.9 1.71 6.4 
5 1.72 1.6 ** ** 1.53 4.6 2.56 1.1 6 ** ** ** ** ** 
Group Mean 
a;nd Total 
Percent 1.59 99.6 1. 66 99 .• 2 1.73 98.6 1.48 98.8 1 .51 100.0 
(I' ) (1471+) {58o) (427) (349) {.14 514; 
Eta .13 .15 .15 • 11 • 16 
*Cell--eutri:e~-are--mean--Iuternal--iIieffic acy--values-. ---:rhe--Y;iiterna 1 
inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least ineff icacious to 3 = most 
i;nefficacious. 




Table 10b. Mean Internal Inefficacy by Distance 







__ li:i;U:tI ____ !1gl!.!l!_1i __ Jgl!!L __ ! ____ !1~©..!L __ ! ___ l:!.~!l. __ ! ____ !'l~!!!L_,_~ ___ _ 
f', 1.55 2.4 1.58 2 .. 4 1.56 4.8 ** 1. 59 2.2 'J 
1 1.50 31.8 1.50 43.2 1.68 40.4 1.70 14.9 1. 28 31.2 
2 1.55 41.8 1.63 39.8 1.66 40.0 1.37 41.8 1.58 45.1+ 
3 1.1+ 6 17.3 1.66 12.5 1.79 12.1 1.21 29.9 1.62 14.2 
4 1.56 5.4 1.20 2.0 1. 11 2.2 1. 39 10.6 1 .91 5.7 
5 1.39 1.4 ** ** 1.43 3.3 1.25 1.6 
6 ** ** ** ** ** 
Graul' Mean 
and Total 
PeJ:cent 1.52 100 .1 1. 57 99.9 1.67 100.1 1.39 100.5 1.51 100.3 
(N l (1453) (502) (416) (368) {50?) 
Eta .04 .09 .10 .13 .17 
*c;ll-;;tri;~--~re--m€~;--I~te;nal--inefflcacy--values~---The--Internal 
inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most 
inefficacious. 
**N wa s less hhan 5 or less than one percent of the total. 
Table 11a. f1€an Internal Political Inefficacy by Distance 
from Eoth parties, 1970 
Distance from !l.is:!:;!!!!£SL.f!;:Q!L!l.'i!!!Q£HUfU,~!!£n 
Republican 
~~!;::!:;y __________ ~ _________ l _________ £ ________ I _________ ! _______ Tot~l 
0 2.07* 1.71 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.98 
(2.4%) (O.6) to.8) (0.1) {O.3) (4.2) 
1 2.00 1.88 1. 84 1.55 1.64 1.82 
(1 .9) (12.1) (7.2) (3.4) (1.0) (25.6) 
2 2.18 1.90 1.87 1.92 1.83 1.90 
(1.5) (9.9) (16.0) (5.5) (1 .6) (34.4) 
3 2.27 1.96 1.99 1.92 2.00 1.98 
(1.3) (6.2) {7.4} (5.7 j (1.8) (22.4) 
4 2.31 2.06 2.02 2.23 2.28 2.13 
t2.3) (4.2) (4.0) (1 .2) (1. 6) (n.4) 
Total 2. 16 1.92 1.91 1. 86 1.97 1. 93 
(9.5%) (33.0) (35.4) {1 5. 8) (6.3) ( 1QO.0%) 
Eta = .039 N=1115 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
*Cell entries arE lltean internal inefficacy val,ues. The efficacy 
scale ranged from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inef£icacians. 
The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of cases in each cell. 
Tahle 110. !'lean Internal Political Inefficacy hy Distance 
fl'Olll Both parties, 1976 
Dis ta ncef I'o m ll.i§!an"-Lt.~Q!lLll.g!!Qf<£.9.1;h!<_l::l!£lY 
Repuhlican 
R~r!y __________ Q _________ l _________ £ ________ ~ _________ ~ _______ Toll!l 
0 1.38* 1.73 1. 80 1.43 2.GO 1.69 
(0.4% l (O.7) (0. 4) fO • ") (O.4) p.1) 
1 1.88 1.73 1.81 1.68 1. 89 1.77 
(0.7) (11.81 ('1.9) (4.1 ) {2.5} (28.9) 
2 2~OO 1.86 2.00 1.89 1.65 1.92 
{0.5} pO.O) (20.7) (5.9) (2.6) ( 39.7) 
3 ** 1.84 1.92 2.07 2.31 1.95 
(5.2) (8.9) (5.2). p. 1) (21. 4) 
4 1.68 2.35 1.84 2.45 2.00 2.08 
(1. 1) (2.9) (2.7) (1.0) (0.4) (8.0) 
Total 1.75 1.85 1.92 1.92 1. 88 1.89 
(2.7%) ( 31. 6) (42.5) ,16. 3) (6.7) (;QO.O%) 
Eta = .016 N=1140 
------------------------,----------------------------------------
*Cell entl'ies al'e mean inteiLnal efficacy val.ues. The inefficacy 
scale iLanged fl'om () = least inefficacious to 3 = mO.stinefficacious. 
The numbers in parenthesis aree the percentage of case.s in each cell. 
**No cases. 
'ranle 12a. Multiple Regr:ession o£ Social Location Variables 
and policy Dissatisfaction on Political Cynicism 
_12.1Q _un _12.1~ _197§. 
Distance from 
RepublicaI\ Party .269* .329 .150 .238 
Distance from 
D~elllocratic Party .139 .044 .137 • 111 
Education - .130 - .132 -.1.30 -.116 
Incollle -.067 -.042 - .033 .010 
Sex .017 -.043 .030 .070 
Race .024 .036 .052 .034 
R-squar;e .138 .148 .079 .097 
iN )~ (Ba9) ( 1360) { 1478) { 1329) 
-----------------------------------------------------------
*Beta Reignts (standar;dized r;egression coe£ficients). 
Table 12b. Multiple Regression of Social Location Variables 
and policy Dissatisfaction on Internal Inefficacy 
_lZ1Q _12U _HI!! _122£ 
Distance from 
Republican PaLty .027* .064 .011 .037 
Distance _from 
Democratic Party .005 .046 .. 028 .031 
Education -.388 -.334 -.346 -.379 
Incollle -.089 -.106 -.063 - .. 070 
Sex .092 .034 .045 .026 
Rac.e .061 .063 • 112 .037 
R-square .214 .170 .169 .183 
(N) (1406) (1370) ( 1483) { 1344} 
Table 12c. Multiple Regression of Social Location Variables 
and policy Dissatisfaction on External Inefficacy 
_.1.EQ _121.£ _l.zH _1.212 
Distance from 
Republican Party .144* .180 .084 .105 
Distance from 
Democratic Party .092 .073 .087 .129 
Ed ucation -.248 -.224 -.279 -.195 
Income -.124 -.055 -.034 -.096 
Sex -.053 -.025 -.068 -.053 
Race .066 .076 .137 .012 
R-square .156 .122 .141 .095 
IN) (BBS) (1367) (1474) ( 1 338) 
( 
APPENDIX 
This appendix I,eports the data used in Figures 1 thIough 
15. All values refer to lllean Ie vels of political cynicism, 
internal political inefficac y, or external political 
inefficacy. Numbers in parenthesis refer to the Ns in each 
ca tegory. The cynicism scale ranges from {) = 101< cynicism to 
5 = high cynicism. Both of the ine£,Licacy scales range from 
{) = low inefficacy to 3 = high inefficacy. The tables are in 
the same order as the presentation of the figures. 
Tabl.e A.. 1 • Mean Political. Cynicism by Sex, 1958 to 1976 
----------------------------------------------------
MEAN MEAN MEAN IlEAH MEAN ilEAN ilEAN 
(N I (N) (N) iN) (N) iN} (N) 
1958 19M 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Male 2.12 1.54 1.76 2.43 2.45 2.91 2.96 
( 797) (1885) (1144) ( 795) ( 95.31 (1030) (1164 ) 
Female 2.12 1.57 1.56 2.4() 2.45 3.01 3.07 
( 861) (2276) (1434) (1'J15) (1235) {13901 (1559) 
Eta= .002 .011 .077 .009 .002 .034 .035 
Tahle A.2. Mean External political Inefficacy hy 
Sex, 1958 to 1976 
------------,------------------------------------
MEAN l'lEAN MEAN MEAN ~lEAN 
{!ill (!ilJ (Nj IN) (N) 
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Male 1. 42 1.69 1. 74 1.87 1.51 
(1151) ( 8(6) {1151} {1 OB} (1179) 
Female 1.45 1. 58 1.75 1.70 1.66 
(1466 ) (1027) (1499) (;1401j ( 160 1) 
Eta::::: .013 .044 .004 .073 .015 
Table a.3. rlean Internal PoLitical Political Inefficacy by Sex, 1952 to 1976 
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN 
(N) (N) (N) (N) (N) IN) (N) (N) (N) (N) 
1952 1956 1960 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
-- .... - - ---
Ma le 1 .71 1.50 1.50 1. 61 1.63 1.55 1.55 1.64 1.65 1. 31 
( 811) ( 780) ( 867) (2093) ( 557) ( 1155, ( 814) ( 1162) (1052) (1197) 
Female 1.95 1.77 1.65 1. 76 1. 85 1.78 1.76 1.85 1.79 1 .98 
( 950) ( 963) ( 1051) (25271 t 699) (1500) (1053) (14211) (1!i32) (16311) 
Eta= .140 • 1 !ill .082 .077 .110 .110 .105 .108 .075 .075 
Table ~r....-.. 4 ,. Mean political Cynicism by Rac<e., 1958 to 1976 
-----------------------------------------------------
MEAN !'lEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN 
(I'll (1'1) {N l (N) (N) {N} (I'll 
1958 1964 1968 197/) 1972 1974 1976 
White 2. 11 1.59 1.69 2.36 2.37 2.93 2.98 
(t50 2)< (3768) (2322) ( 1619) (1956j (2167) (2394) 
Non-white 2.20 1.27 1.29 2.85 3",12 3.29 3.34 
{ 156} ( 393) { 256} ( 191) ( 232) { 242) ( 3(7) 
Eta= .018 .060 .096 .094 .142 .071 .076 
Table a.S. Mean Internal political Inefficacy by Race, 1952 to 1976 
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN .MEAN MEAN MEAN 
(N) (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) IN) (N) (N) 
1952 1956 1960 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
white 1. 80 1.60 1.55 1.67 1.72 1.64 1.63 1.72 1.70 1 .40 
(1593) ( 1 597) ( 17 37) (417 0) (1113) (2382) (1670) (2382) (2226) (2467) 
Non-whi te 2.28 2.21 1.86 1.91 2.01 2.07 2.02 2.04 2. a 6 1.45 
( 167) ( 146) ( 181) ( 450) ( 143) ( 273) ( 197) ( 304) ( 246) ( 339) 
Eta= .168 .179 .097 .076 .095 .124 • 121 .100 .11 0 .013 
White 
Tahle A. 6. /lean External political Inefficacy 
by Race. 1958 to 1976 
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN l1EAN 
(I'll (N) {N) (N) iN) 
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
1. 40 1.57 1. 68 1.72 1.53 
(2350 I (1640) {23521 (2177) ( 2433) 
Non-white 1.78 2.13 2 .. 26 2.30 1.53 
( 267) { 1931 ( 298) ( 245) ( 325) 
.097 .143 .155 .149 .001 
Table A ~ 7. Mean Political Cynicism by Education, 1958 to 1976 
-----,--_._----------------------------------------------------
IIEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN r1EAN MEAN MEILN 
(!-I) (N) {N} (N) (Nl (N) tN) 
1958 1964 1968 197J 1972 19711 1976 
Less than 2.37 1.71 1.90 2.83 2.78 3.26 3.32 
8th grade I 467) ( 974) ( 549) ( 4081 ( 3971 ( 432) ( 426) 
Some high 2.14 1.54 1.72 2.57 2.54 3.26 3.23 
school ( 3(6) ( 822) ( 463) ( 293) ( 388) ( 412) t 389) 
High school 2.02 1.41 1.54 2.25 2.45 2.98 3.01,1 
gradua te { 523) {1343} ( 817) ( 635) . ( 1191 { 802 1 (1004) 
Some college 2.09 1.69 1.70 2.20 2.29 2.69 2.91 
( 181) ( 518) ( 389) ( 268) ( 371) ( 400) { 453} 
College graduate 1.74 1.56 1.39 2.13 2.12 2.59 2.62 
or more ( 168) ( 479) { 3591 ( 202) { 311 } ( 355) .( 440) 
Eta .132 .080 .131 .164 .125 .166 .147 
Table a.8. Mean Inte~nal political Inefficacy by Education, 1952 to 1976 
MEAN t1EAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN 
(N) (N) ( N) (N) ( N) (to ( N) (N) (N) (N) 
1952 1956 1960 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Less than 2. 14 2.14 1.95 2.20 2.22 2.28 2.21 2.27 2.29 1. 73 
hiyh schaal ( 710) ( 528) ( 572) (1133) ( 315) ( 596) ( !t3 3) ( 526) ( 448) ( 474) 
Some high 1.82 1.66 1. 72 1 .91 2.00 2.03 2.00 2.09 1 .95 1. 71 
school ( 359) ( 668) ( 363) ( 898) ( 229) ( lI81) ( 302) ( 479) ( 427) ( 412) 
Hiyh school 1.69 1. 55 1.49 1.58 1.69 1. 58 1.60 1. 76 1. 81 1.49 
g~aduate ( 426) ( 210) ( 558) (1455) ( 408) ( 824) ( 644) ( 890) ( 826) (1022) 
Some collHge 1. 45 .99 1. 15 1.24 1.25 1. 29 1.20 1.37 1. 35 1. 26 
( 148) ( 189) ( 230) ( 590) ( 177) ( 392) ( 275) ( 435) ( 405) ( 462) 
College graduate 1.08 .82 1. 01 1. 01 .97 .87 .85 1. 01 1. 00 .79 
o~ mo~e ( 114 ) ( 141) ( 194) ( 512) ( 121 ) ( 361 ) ( 207) ( 353) ( 359) ( 448) 
E,ta= .358 .443 .341 .417 .417 .444 .437 • 410 • 418 .277 
Tahle A.9. Mean External political Inefficacy 
by Education, 1958 to 1976 
----------------------------------------------
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN 
(N) (N) (NI (!:I) IN) 
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Less than 1.99 2.17 2.29 2.36 1. 73 
8th grade ( 574) ( 427) { 506} ( 444l ( 459) 
Some high 1.75 1.82 2.01 2.04 1. 79 
school { 476} ( 295) ( 473) ( '11 2) ( 4(0) 
High scbool 1. 30 1. 52 1.67 1.78 1. 53 
gr aduatce { 821) ( 632) f 883) ( 8131 ( 1 00 9) 
Some college 1.14 1. 24 1 .. 40 1.40 1. 49 
( 390j ( 273) ( 433) { 397) ( 455) 
College graduate .79 1.02 1.20 1.12 1. 16 
or more ( 355) ( 2(1) ( 352) ( 355) t 445} 
Eta .337 .309 .303 .340 .158 
Table A. 10. Mean Political Cynicism by Family Il1come , 
1958 to 1976 
------------------------------------------------------
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN 
(Nj {Nj (N) ( N) (N) (N) (N) 
1958 1964 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Low income 2.41 1.82 1.70 2.72 2.63 3.16 3.07 , 233) , 745) ( 589) ( 359J ( 371) f 491 ) { 565} 
11edium low 2.19 1.43 1.75 2.45 2.30 3.22 3.11 
income ( 331) ( 721) V 338.) ( 437) ( 499) .~ 421) ( 443) 
Medium Income 2.00 1.49 1.67 2.53 2.49 2.76 2.94 
{ 466) (1062) ( 670) ( 279) ( 452) ( 387) ( 476) 
Medium high 2.17 1.52 1.57 2.07 2.26 2.86 3.02 
income ( 217) ( 644) ( 408) ( 4021 ( 348) { 607} ( 472) 
High income 1.92 1.51 1. 57 2.22 2.17 2.78 2.85 
( 361) ( 855) ( 526) ( 265) ( 461) t 374) ( 575) 
Eta= .111 .084 .. 052 .146 .112 .124 .063 
Table a.11. Mean Internal Political Political Inefficacy by 
Family Income, 1952 to 1976 
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN tlEAN ['lEA N MEAN MF.I\N MEAN 
(N 1 (N) tN) (N) ( N) (N) ( N) (N) (N) (N) 
1952 1956 1960 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Low income 2.25 2.12 1.93 2.12 2.10 2.12 2.05 2.12 2.05 1.68 
( 337) ( 418) ( 435) ( 842) ( 233) ( 620) ( 381) ( 491) ( 5101 ( 613) 
Medium low 1 .99 1. 78 1.67 1. 86 1 .95 1.86 1.87 1.90 1. 84 1.50 
income ( 271) ( 219) ( 406) ( 821) ( 241) ( 348) ( 4 tl5) ( 606) ( 43 3) ( tl62) 
Medium income 1.85 1. 72 1.56 1.62 1 .66 1.69 1 .62 1 .81 1. 73 1. 33 
( 394) ( 271) ( 312) ( 11 62) ( 271) ( 677) ( 292) ( 5 110) ( 396) ( 1178) 
Medium high 1.70 1.45 1.46 1.59 1 .69 1. 36 1.39 1.55 1.58 1. 41 
income ( 261) I 448) ( 262) ( 692) f 239) ( 417) ( 407) ( 403) ( 609) ( 482) 
High income 1. 51 1. 16 1.30 1. 29 1.27 1.26 1. 26 1.34 1. 33 1. 12 
( 456) ( 3251 , 481) ( 927) ( 230) ( 536) ( 269) ( 556) ( 381) ( 585) 
Eta: .305 .357 .244 .293 .286 .304 .290 .269 .243 .177 
Tahle A .. 12. i:lean Exte!:nal political Inefficacy hy 
Family IncomeI' 1968 to 1976 
---------,---------------------------------------
MEAN <lEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN 
iN} (Nl {N) ! N) ( N) 
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Low income 1.92 2.08 2.12 2.10 1.77 
( 6(9) ( 374) ( 4811 ( 5(3) ( 596) 
l'iediul1l low 1.60 1.74 1.83 1. 90 1.61 
incol/le ( 344) ( 441 ) ( 5951 I 420) ( 458) , 
Hedium income 1. 34 1.70 1. 72 1. 64 1. 47 
( 668) ( 284) ( 535) ( 388) ( 470) 
Hedium l1igh 1.17 1. 27 1.68 1. 71 1.51 
income ( 415) { 3981 ( 402) ( 609) ( l! 75) 
Higl1 income 1.07 1.20 1. 36 1.34 1. 34 
( 532) ( 265) ( 553) ( 379) ( 519) 
Eta= .268 .263 .208 .21 (; .123 
Table a.13. Mean In~ernal poli~ical Poli~ical Inefficacy by 
Subjective Social Class, 1952 to 1975 
~lE A N MIlAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN 
(N) ( N) (N) (N) ( N) ( N) (N) ( NI (N) (N I 
1952 1956 1960 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
---- ----
Working 1.98 1.86 1. 7 1 1.43 1.. 97 1.98 1.87 2.01 1. 93 1 .57 
cLi.ss (1058) (1052) (1243) (18511 ( 719) (1419) ( 964) ( 1434) (129.5) (1440) 
Micl d le 1.62 1. 29 1.33 1.20 1. 43 1.34 1.45 1.46 1.49 1.25 
class ( 655) ( 628) ( 616) ( 79) ( 501) (11601 ( 845) (1175) (1066) (1280) 
Eta= .205 .245 .190 .047 .274 .305 .204 .272 .223 .143 
Table 1\..14. Mean External po.litical Ineffioacy by 
Subjective Social Class, 1968 to 1976 
MEAN 11EAN MEAN .M EAN MEAN 
{N) {I') (I') (N ). (N) 
1968 1970 1972 1974 19.76 
Working class 1.70 1. 88 1.97 2.00 1.64 
\1399) ( 949) (1414j (1265) (1410) 
Middle class 1.15 1.33 1.46 1.47 1.41 
(1150) (829) (1165) (;10481 (1265) 
Eta= .22~ .226 .214 .225 .091 
{ 
Table A .15 * Mean political :::ynicislll by Subjective Social Glass, 
1958 to 1976 
----------------------------------------------------------------
MEAN MEAN !'lEAN MEAN MEAN !'lEAN !'lEII.N 
(N) (iI} (N) IN) (N) (N) (M) 
1958 1964 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Working class 2.20 1.56 1.77 2.58 2.63 3.18 3.13 
( 974) (1677) (1366) ( 935i (11461 ( 1251) t 1381 ) 
Middle class 2.01 1.78 1.52 2.23 2.24 2.69 2.88 
( 645) ( 73) ( 114) ( 822) ( 997) {1G52} {1249) 
Eta= .1)63 .029 .097 .109 .118 .150 .085 
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